In “Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth”, David Copp explores some ways in which a defender of synthetic moral naturalism might attempt to get around our Moral Twin Earth argument. Copp nicely brings out the force of our argument, not only through his exposition of it, but through his attempt to defeat it, since his efforts, we think, only help to make manifest the deep difficulties the Moral Twin Earth argument poses for the synthetic moral naturalist. Our response to Copp will be in two stages. First we will make some general observations about our argument that help one appreciate its force, and then we will turn to the details of Copp’s proposals.

1. COOKING WITH MORAL TWIN EARTH: A RECIPE FOR DECONSTRUCTION

Our generic Moral Twin Earth argument is intended to undermine versions of naturalistic moral realism – a type of metaethical view according to which moral terms like ‘good’ and ‘right’ refer to natural properties of some sort, and so moral judgments of the form, ‘A is good’ and ‘A is right’ are true just in case A has the relevant natural property to which the moral terms refer. This form of moral realism is supposed to be incompatible with versions of moral relativism; if two individuals or groups make what appear to be conflicting moral judgments about some object of moral evaluation, then, assuming they are using moral terms properly, they are engaged in a genuine disagreement and at least one group must be mistaken. Following Copp, we will call any such view a version of moral naturalism.

Although in our writings we have mainly focused our Moral Twin Earth argument on one specific version of moral naturalism, viz., the version suggested by Richard Boyd (1988), the specific argument we press against this view provides the basis for a recipe for deconstruction, in the form of a generic argument. Here is how it is supposed to work. The moral naturalist tells us a story – or at least offers a sketch of a story – about
how the reference of moral terms like ‘good’ and ‘right’, when used for moral evaluation, gets fixed. This story says something about the putative reference-fixing relation $R$, for moral terms and concepts. We now pose a dilemma for the proposed version of moral naturalism, with its specific account of reference-fixing for moral terms.

The first horn is that the putatively reference-fixing relation $R$ might fail to fix determinate reference-relations between moral terms and certain natural properties, because there are too many eligible natural properties that satisfy the constraints imposed by $R$. For instance, perhaps the $R$-constraints are satisfied by a class of natural properties – functional properties, say – that collectively satisfy some consequentialist moral theory $T^C$, and yet the $R$-constraints are also satisfied by another class of natural properties – also functional properties, say – that collectively satisfy some deontological moral theory $T^D$.3

The second horn of the dilemma arises if one grants (at least for argument’s sake) that the proposed reference-fixing relation $R$ suffices to pin down some unique class of natural properties as the putative referents of moral terms. We now tell a story about two groups, one on earth and one on Twin Earth (though the Twin Earth device really is not necessary)4 where the natural properties $R$-linked to the moral terms as used by both groups are different on earth than on Twin Earth. We grant our opposition (at least for the sake of argument) its assumption that there is a single natural property to which all human uses of ‘right’ (and its synonyms in other languages) are appropriately $R$-related. We then go on to suppose, for the sake of vividness, that on earth the term ‘right’, in its moral uses, is appropriately $R$-related (according to the account on offer) to the sort of natural property satisfying a consequentialist moral theory $T^C$ (say, a functional property characterizable in terms of $T^C$) while on Moral Twin Earth, ‘right’ is appropriately $R$-related to the sort of natural property satisfying a nonconsequentialist, deontological moral theory $T^D$ (say, a functional property characterizable in terms of $T^D$). Now the point of constructing this sort of scenario is that it reveals that the proposed version of naturalistic moral realism is committed to objectionable relativism: in cases where the two groups are engaged in what appears to be substantive moral disagreement, it turns out that according to the proposal, what each side says is (in their own mouths) true, because for each side the moral terms stand in the reference-determining relation to certain natural properties such that the moral statement, in the speaker’s mouth, is true. But then, the groups are really talking past one another; there is no genuine disagreement in the beliefs expressed by the assertions that employ the moral and the twin-moral vocabulary. Depending on the details of the specific version of
naturalistic moral realism under consideration, the view turns out either to be guilty of one or another kind of objectionable relativism. On the one hand it is guilty of *chauvinistic conceptual relativism* if it is committed to saying that the orthographically identical human and twin-human words ‘right’ have different meanings, as well as different referents (analogously to the human and twin-human words ‘water’ in Putnam’s original Twin Earth scenario). On the other hand, if the view implies that ‘right’ has the same meaning in English as in Twin English, but has different referent-properties when employed by humans and twin humans respectively, then it is guilty of *standard relativism*, since then the very same moral judgment may, e.g., be true for earthlings but false for twin earthlings.

Of course, we have not tested every possible version of moral naturalism, and we do not claim to have any sort of a priori proof that the fate of every such view must be one or the other horn of our dilemma. But reflection on the situation encourages this prediction. After all, there is a certain systematic symmetry between earth and Twin Earth scenarios. It is very hard to see what sort of story about reference-fixing, for moral and twin-moral terms, could manage to break that symmetry in a way that both (1) allows for genuine disagreement (rather than being committed to objectionable relativism, given the symmetry), and (2) yields significant determinacy of moral facts and moral truths (rather than surrendering determinacy, because of the symmetry). Either the putative reference-fixing relation $R$ will fail to secure determinate reference at all (because there are too many natural properties as eligible referents for moral terms), or else $R$ will link moral terms to different natural properties on earth and on Moral Twin Earth – so that the claim that $R$ fixes reference ends up committed to objectionable relativism.

Note in particular that our argument, viewed at this generic level of description, does not assume that sameness of meaning requires sameness of reference (or even some restricted version of this thesis). It appears to us that some versions of moral naturalism do seem to assume this, e.g., ones like Boyd’s that take the semantics of natural kind terms like ‘water’ as a paradigm, and follow Putnam in saying that on Twin Earth we get difference of meaning *because* of the relevant kind of difference in reference. Such versions fall prey to chauvinistic conceptual relativism. But here the relevant principle about sameness of meaning requiring sameness of reference is part of the specific version of naturalistic moral semantics to which we are applying our recipe. Although one could easily get the impression from our prior writings that any Moral Twin Earth scenario will incorporate this principle, we would deny this and so Copp is mistaken when he writes: “In any Moral Twin Earth scenario, the semantic theory at issue
would imply that moral and twin-moral terms differ in meaning and that Earthlings and Twin Earthlings do not have genuine moral disagreements” (pp. 9–10).6

So, our Moral Twin Earth argument is a deconstructive recipe: show us your version of moral naturalism, complete with a story (or at least sketch of one) about how reference is fixed for moral terms. Either your story will fail by generating radical indeterminacy of reference, or else we will cook up the relevant Twin Earth scenario to reveal that your view suffers from objectionable relativism.

2. COPPING OUT

The gist of Copp’s response to our Moral Twin Earth argument is to suggest that the moral naturalist develop a semantic account of moral terms that (1) preserves the idea that the two groups featured in our argument use moral terms with the same meaning (and thereby preserves the intuition that the groups engage in genuine moral disagreement); (2) implies that both groups, in their moral uses of such terms as ‘right’ and ‘good’, are referring to the same properties of rightness and goodness; and yet (3) the moral judgments of one of the groups are mistaken (thus avoiding unwanted relativist implications). But Copp has not delivered a semantic story that accomplishes these feats and we think there is good reason to be extremely pessimistic about the prospects of developing one. To see why, let us consider Copp’s two stage reply, taking the stages in order.

In his first reply to us, Copp attempts to show that even if the corresponding moral terms of the two groups in question differ in the properties they express, it need not be the case that the groups mean something different by their uses of those terms; in short: he attempts to show how, for moral terms, differences of reference need not yield differences in meaning. For instance, Copp considers the semantical workings of a term like ‘milk’, where it is plausible that functional facts about milk rather than facts about constitution are prominent in something’s counting as milk, and so the corresponding earth and Twin Earth term ‘milk’ has the same meaning, though it varies in reference. Moral terms like ‘good’ and ‘right’ are, he suggests, plausibly understood to be semantically more analogous to a term like ‘milk’ than to a term like ‘water’. If so, then even if the corresponding moral terms of the two groups differ in reference, we can still make sense of the idea that the two groups are engaging in moral dispute within a common language. He then concludes that the Moral Twin Earth argument has been undone because it rests on the assumption that sameness of meaning requires sameness of reference.
But our argument, understood generically, does not make this assumption, although, as we just explained, the assumption does seem to be implicated in Boyd’s particular account of the semantics of moral terms like ‘right’ and ‘good’. Even if the moral naturalist proposes a reference-fixing story for moral terms that rejects the assumption in question and so allows for sameness of meaning despite difference in reference, the story would not escape our argument. In fact, such a view, assuming it manages to avoid the indeterminacy horn of our dilemma, still would fall prey to the second horn: objectionable relativism. After all, on such a view, when earthlings and twin earthlings appear to utter contradictory moral statements about some object of moral evaluation, they can both be saying something true. So now the problem is a commitment to standard relativism, rather than to chauvinistic conceptual relativism.

Granted, there may well be, nevertheless, some sort of disagreement between the groups (C. L. Stevenson 7 would have talked about a disagreement in attitudes), but we do not have here a disagreement in belief. This is not acceptable to the moral naturalist, who thinks that moral judgments are beliefs that, vagueness aside, are either true or false, and that when two parties utter or think what appear to be contradictory moral claims, there is a disagreement in belief.

So our response to Copp’s first reply is to deny that our generic Moral Twin Earth argument presupposes that for moral terms, difference in reference results in difference in meaning. Any account of the semantics of moral terms that allows for difference in reference even if there is sameness of meaning is guilty of objectionable relativism, an implication the moral naturalist cannot allow.

Now Copp himself notes that the moral naturalist might well not be entirely happy with the results of his first reply; he thinks, quite rightly, that the naturalist is going to want a semantic view according to which we have same meaning and same reference for the two groups in question. We have just explained why: the moral naturalist (understood as a moral realist) wants to avoid relativism – both conceptual and standard versions of relativism. This brings us to Copp’s second reply, in which he attempts to explain how the moral naturalist can plausibly tell a semantic story whose implications are that not only do earthlings and moral twin earthlings use corresponding moral terms with the same meanings, but they use them to refer to the same properties. Presumably, a semantic view with this implication would secure genuine disagreements in belief.

What the moral naturalist needs here is an account of, or at least a sketch of an account of, what fixes reference for moral terms – an account that on the one hand secures determinate reference to moral properties (despite
the problem of many eligible referents), and on the other hand avoids both conceptual and standard relativism with respect to a suitable Moral Twin Earth scenario. In an earlier version of his paper, Copp claimed that it is consistent with our Moral Twin Earth argument to assume that there is a single true moral theory whose moral terms refer to natural properties, and so he proposed that the moral naturalist help himself both to the assumption that there is such a theory, and also to the assumption that the moral beliefs of one group accord with that theory while the moral beliefs of the other group do not. But simply making this move does not help, for, as we have been saying, what the moral naturalist needs is some suitable reference-fixing story for moral terms. Short of some such story, the naturalist lacks a dialectically legitimate basis for supposing that there is a true moral theory. (And even if there is one, the naturalist has no basis for supposing that the moral properties posited by the theory are identical with, or are constituted by, natural properties. After all, it is consistent with there being a single true moral theory that moral properties are nonnatural properties – something the moral naturalist cannot accept.)

We maintain, based on our use of the Moral Twin Earth argument against Boyd, that a causal-regulation account of reference-fixing will not work for moral terms. But, as Copp points out, one difference between Boyd’s view about the semantic workings of certain kinds of terms and Putnam’s view is that Putnam appeals to the community’s linguistic intentions and related interests in securing reference for natural kind terms. If, as we think, a causal story will not fly for moral terms, perhaps moral naturalism can appeal to linguistic and, in particular, referential intentions and related interests in giving an account of how reference is determined for moral terms. Copp hints at this possibility, so let us consider it further.

Suppose, then, that we appeal to commonalities in referential intentions of earthlings and twin earthlings. As Copp emphasizes, there is enough commonality in the functional roles that moral and twin-moral terms and judgments play for both groups to plausibly suppose that there is commonality (at least sufficient overlap) in referential intentions between the two groups. Here we need more detail. So let us begin by supposing that both groups use moral terms with the intention of picking out those properties that bear on human flourishing (and perhaps the flourishing of certain nonhumans) as judged from a standpoint of impartiality. The hope is that by appealing to such notions, we might settle on some one moral theory which would, in turn, reveal to us the natural properties that are identical with or constitute moral properties. But now notice that the other horn of our dilemma, viz., indeterminacy of reference, comes into focus. After all, talk of flourishing and impartiality is quite vague – different, incom-
patible moral theories are equally compatible with the generic notions of flourishing and impartiality. Let us focus for a moment on the notion of impartiality – the idea that everyone is to be accorded equal respect. The problem of appealing to this notion is that it lacks sufficient determinacy and so cannot serve to pin down the referents of moral terms. James Griffin brings out the point nicely:

Every moral theory has the notion of equal respect at its heart: regarding each person as, in some sense, on an equal footing with every other one. Different moral theories parlay this vague notion into different conceptions. Ideas such as the Ideal Observer or the Ideal Contractor specify the notion a little further, but then they too are very vague and allow quite different moral theories to be got out of them. And the moral theories are not simply derivations from these vague notions, because the notions are too vague to allow anything as tight as a derivation. Too vague, but not totally empty; although the moral theories that we end up with put content into all these notions, the notions themselves also do something towards shaping the theories. (Griffin 1986, 208)

Talk of flourishing is vague in just the same way. Moreover, the same will be true of other notions that, like equal respect and flourishing, might plausibly be understood as part of the very concept of moral thought and discourse. So it just does not look as if the moral naturalist is going to be able to appeal to common referential intentions associated with moral thought and discourse in an attempt to tell a story about moral reference that yields determinacy of reference for terms like ‘good’ and ‘right’.

One might suppose that there is an important disanalogy between Putnam’s Twin Earth scenario about water and our Moral Twin Earth scenario: on earth, water is composed of H2O, whereas on Twin Earth, what they call ‘water’ is composed of XYZ; but in the moral case both consequentialist and deontological properties are ‘out there’. One might think that this difference is significant and that it can be exploited by the moral naturalist to her advantage. Clearly, there is just such a difference, but far from helping the moral naturalist overcome the Moral Twin Earth argument, the fact that both planets are ones in which both consequentialist and deontological properties are eligible referents for moral terms makes things worse for the naturalist. On both earth and Moral Twin Earth there are too many natural properties available to serve as referents of moral terms like ‘good’ and ‘right’ – specifically, the functional property definable as the ‘good’-role property by a consequentialist theory $T^C$, and the functional property definable as the ‘good’-role property by a deontological theory $T^D$. Both properties are compatible with generic ideas of flourishing and impartiality. It looks like appeal to referential intentions that the two groups share, involving notions like flourishing and impartiality, is too weak to pin down the referents of moral terms; moral indeterminacy results.
At this point, the moral naturalist might attempt to work with a more robust notion of, say, impartiality, that would be more likely to yield determinacy of reference and thus, in connection with the Moral Twin Earth scenario, serve as a basis for fixing the referents of moral terms. However, going this route leads to the other horn of the dilemma, viz., objectionable relativism. Both groups can appeal to a morally loaded notion of impartiality robust enough to fix reference in a way that in effect comports with one of the normative theories in question and is incompatible with the competing moral theory. But then we have failed to tell a story that yields the desired result, viz., sameness of reference for the corresponding moral terms of the two groups; we are back to standard relativism.

If referential intentions associated with moral terms will not help the moral naturalist, perhaps she can look around for something in the world, or in ways that persons on earth and on Moral Twin Earth are respectively related to properties in their worlds – something that would take up the slack so to speak, and yield adequate referential determinacy for moral terms. But now the moral naturalist needs to specify just what natural facts break the reference-fixing symmetry between us and the moral twin earthlings in a way that makes both groups end up with common referents, and with one group having a true moral theory and the other a false one. Yet it appears that whatever relevant, putatively reference-fixing, relations we bear to certain natural properties (e.g., to consequentialist functional properties), there will be a Twin Earth scenario in which the moral twin earthlings bear the same kinds of relations to distinct natural properties (e.g., deontological functional properties). Here again we are being driven to standard relativism.

We can put the point this way: for any story the moral naturalist might put forth about the natural relation $R$ that allegedly fixes reference for moral terms, if $R$ links human moral terms to some unique class of natural properties (thereby avoiding indeterminacy), then one will always be able to concoct a Moral Twin Earth scenario in which the twin earthlings bear the same relation $R$ to different natural properties than do humans. And it certainly looks as though, in such a scenario, the right thing to say is that earthlings and twin earthlings have genuine disagreement in moral belief – they are not talking past one another and it is not the case that both are speaking the truth. This will mean that $R$ does not fix moral reference after all; to say that it does would be to commit oneself to objectionable relativism.

Before concluding, it may help to have a visual aid outlining the various routes to relativism and indeterminacy awaiting (we think) the moral naturalist. Suppose, then, that the moral naturalist proposes a reference-fixing
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story for moral terms. One can trace the unhappy fate of the proposed view by asking whether, according to the story on offer, moral terms, as used by the two groups featured in the Moral Twin Earth scenario, have the same meaning, and then proceeding to questions about reference. Our flow chart (Figure 1) summarizes the various main options we have discussed in this paper.

With all of this out on the table, let us briefly return to Copp’s paper. In his second reply to the Moral Twin Earth argument, Copp emphasizes that Putnamian semantics has the resources for explaining certain types of error in belief about the subject matter associated with the relevant terms under scrutiny. He thinks that our Moral Twin Earth argument works by not allowing that a moral community can have false beliefs about the referents of their moral terms and by not allowing that they make mistakes in what they take to be instances of actions having certain moral properties. He thus writes:

For even if speakers on Earth believe that all and only actions prohibited by the consequentialist theory Tc are wrong, and even if all the actions called “wrong” on Earth are so prohibited, it does not follow from Putnam’s theory, given the referential intention with which we use the term, that “wrong” refers to the kind, actions that are prohibited by the consequentialist theory Tc, or that wrongness is the property of being so prohibited. (p. 24)

He goes on to claim that we assume that this does follow from Putnam’s theory and that it is our ‘major error’.

But our argument, understood generically as we have been explaining it, does not make any such assumption, and the fact that a moral community can be mistaken in the ways that Copp describes is quite beside the point. Let speakers on earth be mistaken, as Copp says they could be. We challenge the moral naturalist to tell us a story (or at least sketch one) about how reference is fixed for moral terms as employed by such speakers (which will involve specifying some relation R which supposedly fixes determinate reference-relations between moral terms and certain natural properties). Assuming (at least for argument’s sake) that the specified relation R is strong enough to avoid the indeterminacy horn of our dilemma, we will concoct a Twin Earth scenario featuring R in which another group’s use of moral terminology is R-related to a distinct set of natural properties. This story will reveal that the reference-fixing story on offer leads to objectionable relativism. Copp thus misses the heart and soul of our argument.11

Another major point in Copp’s second reply to us is his appeal to referential intentions and speaker’s interests, as allegedly pinning down the referents of moral terms. He claims (p. 26) that since, by construction of the Moral Twin Earth scenario, the referential intentions and interests of
Figure 1. Implications of the Moral Twin Earth argument for moral naturalism.
the two groups are the same, and since they are in other ways quite similar (same needs, and so forth), it must be the case that the referents of the corresponding moral terms are the same for both groups; there is no room for referential slack.

But here Copp fails to see that the indeterminacy horn of the dilemma looms large. Given that the groups are similar in the ways we stipulate in our argument, facts about these groups together with the sorts of referential intentions and interests that Copp describes do not suffice to pin down the referents of moral terms – so we have maintained and Copp has done nothing to challenge this claim. Both on earth and on Twin Earth, too many natural properties are available as eligible referents for moral terms – for instance, both consequentialist-functional properties and deontological-functional properties. Out of the frying pan of objectionable relativism; into the fire of referential indeterminacy!

3. CONCLUSION

So, in the end, Copp, far from providing a way around the Moral Twin Earth argument, simply gives a wish list of what the moral naturalist needs to accomplish to overcome our argument: a reference-fixing account for moral terms that secures sameness of meaning and reference and makes it plausible that at least one party to what is acknowledged to be a genuine moral disagreement between the disagreeing parties is making a mistake in moral belief. But reflecting on Moral Twin Earth as a deconstructive recipe, one can appreciate just why this wish list is going to be difficult for the moral naturalist to fill. Our thought experiment does not show in any a priori fashion that it is not fillable, of course. We continue to maintain that no plausible reference-fixing story for moral terms is even remotely in sight that could ‘break symmetry’ between earthlings and twin earthlings in a way that the wish list requires: (1) overcomes extreme indeterminacy of moral reference and moral truth on the one hand, and yet (2) avoids objectionable moral relativism on the other. The Moral Twin Earth argument does indeed continue to pose a serious threat to the moral naturalist.

NOTES

1 Featured in Horgan and Timmons (1991, 1992a, 1992b) and in Timmons (1990, 1999, ch. 2). In Horgan and Timmons (1996), we criticize various versions of moral naturalism using, instead of Moral Twin Earth, a case of moral symmetry involving earthlings and Martians. However, this difference is of no import.
The story might or might not be linked to a more ambitious philosophical account of what constitutes reference, for moral terms or for a wider class of terms that includes them. It might or might not be part of a philosophical proposal for “naturalizing” reference in general, or the reference of moral terms in particular. The account of how reference gets fixed might presuppose intentional mentalistic notions (e.g., the notion of person’s or group’s referential intentions) and/or semantic notions (e.g., the notion of reference itself).

In Horgan and Timmons (1996), we explain how, for the moral naturalist, moral properties can usefully be characterized by Ramsey–Lewis style definite descriptions, constructed out of a specific normative theory. On one variant, moral properties are identified with second-order, functional, properties thus characterized; this seems to be the sort of view suggested by Brink’s (1984, 1989) version of moral functionalism. On another variant that we find suggested by Railton (1993), the definite descriptions are functional “job descriptions” that pick out first-order natural properties (rather than functional properties). Boyd may perhaps be understood either way.

Some philosophers who have sent us papers or who have given papers at conferences about the Moral Twin Earth argument get sidetracked by differences between our moral Twin Earth scenario and Putnam’s original Twin Earth scenario. (More on this below.) It should be noted, however, that the basic idea behind the Moral Twin Earth argument does not require any sort of Twin Earth story. Our story about Martian morals (see footnote 1) and Hare’s story about the disagreement between the missionaries and cannibals (1952, 148–9) involve the kind of symmetry that is essentially like what is featured in our Moral Twin Earth story.

We suppose one might take the suggestions of Boyd regarding the semantics of Moral terms and work them in a way that is not committed to the meaning-reference thesis under discussion here. But then the resulting view, although allowing for sameness of meaning, still gets hooked on the relativism horn of the dilemma – in this case, standard relativism rather than chauvinistic conceptual relativism.

In our previous work, we have not been as clear as we might about this aspect of our argument and so, based on the details of the argument as applied to Boyd’s causal moral semantics, one might well come away with the impression that the argument makes the assumption about meaning and reference in question. Here we are grateful to Copp for helping us clarify the matter.

Here, for convenience, we assume that the moral properties in question are supposed to be functional properties, though this is not essential to our point. See footnote 3.

We remind the reader that typically the specific version of the Moral Twin Earth argument that is geared to some specific version of moral naturalism will be granting, for the sake of argument, certain substantive assumptions made by the version of moral naturalism in question, as adjuncts to the version’s semantical account of the putative reference-fixing relation \( R \). It will then be stipulated that parallel assumptions hold for Moral Twin Earth, with the moral twin earthlings’ terms ‘good’ and ‘right’ being \( R \)-related to different natural properties than the ones to which the corresponding human terms are \( R \)-related. For instance, as we have noted in connection with Boyd’s causal moral semantics, a version might assume that all humans would converge on the same normative theory, under ideally conducted wide reflective equilibrium; and that our moral terms are \( R \)-related to natural (perhaps functional) properties characterizable by that theory.

One obvious kind of worldly relation to which the moral naturalist might appeal is some sort of causal relation: e.g., the referents of moral terms are determined partly by
the property or properties that causally regulate, as Boyd says, a community’s use of such terms. But as we remarked in note 5, even if one develops this idea in a way that preserves sameness of meaning across communities whose moral thought and discourse is causally regulated by different natural properties, we still get objectionable standard relativism.

11 Copp perhaps has again been misled by the details of the version of the naturalistic moral realism we originally criticized into thinking that certain features of our original Moral Twin Earth scenario are a necessary part of any Moral Twin Earth argument. The version of moral realism we originally discussed, an amalgam of claims made by Boyd and by Brink, assumed that human uses of moral terms refer to (in virtue of being causally regulated by) certain natural properties that conform to a normative moral theory $T$ to which humans would all converge under properly-performed reflective equilibrium. Thus, in effect it was built into the view we were criticizing that humans, insofar as they are sufficiently careful and reflective, cannot come to accept a normative moral theory that is false. We granted this (highly dubious) assumption, and built it into our specific Moral Twin Earth scenario for both humans and twin humans, only for the sake of argument, and only for the purpose of refuting that particular version of moral realism. As Copp makes clear, the Boyd–Brink reference-fixing story for moral terms is but one story that a moral naturalist might tell.

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