5 Mandelbaum on moral phenomenology and moral realism

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In his overlooked 1955 book, The Phenomenology of Moral Experience, Maurice Mandelbaum presented a nuanced moral phenomenology, on the basis of which he defended a kind of moral objectivism, specifically moral realism, against the sorts of non-objectivist views in ethics that were popular in analytic philosophy in the 1940s and early 1950s. A central feature of Mandelbaum’s moral phenomenology is the claim that moral experiences of obligation and value involve the “apprehension” of an action or character trait, or other item of evaluation as being “fittingly” or “unfittingly” related to the relevant situation under consideration. Mandelbaum describes these relations of fittingness and unfittingness as “inhering” in the situation one confronts and thus provide (according to Mandelbaum) phenomenological evidence in favor of what we will call an ontological objectivist or realist interpretation of such experiences. According to moral realism, moral judgments are beliefs that purport to represent a realm of “objectively existing” moral facts. We call the argument that goes from facts about moral phenomenology to a metaphysical conclusion about the existence and nature of moral facts “the argument from introspective phenomenology”.

In what follows we have two primary aims. First, because Mandelbaum’s phenomenological ethics is not widely known, we will spend the first part of the chapter setting forth some of the main elements of his phenomenological description of moral experience. But we will do so with particular attention paid those aspects of his view that provide putative evidence for moral realism. Then, in the second part of the chapter, we proceed to examine the argument from introspective phenomenology. We agree with Mandelbaum that the phenomenology of moral experience (which we think he got more or less right) provides pro tanto evidence against such non-objectivist views of his day, including in particular, varieties of non-cognitivism. However, we claim that the essentials of Mandelbaum’s moral phenomenology fits with a particular version of what are now called “expressivist” views about ethical thought and discourse; views that are descended from non-cognitivism, that stand opposed to moral realism, and that have been developed and defended by such contemporary philosophers as Allan Gibbard, Simon Blackburn, and we ourselves. Such views were thus not among metaethical options when Mandelbaum wrote his 1955 book. Because our own version of expressivism – “cognitivist expressivism” – can fully accommodate
the elements of moral phenomenology (as described by Mandelbaum), we argue that his argument from introspective phenomenology ultimately fails.

Mandelbaum’s moral phenomenology

Situating Mandelbaum’s book

Mandelbaum’s *Phenomenology* is not well known, judging from the lack of discussion it has received in the philosophical literature. One likely reason for this is that at the time of its publication it was out of step, so to speak, with the philosophical climate at that time and has since been forgotten. It was published during a time in which the “linguistic turn” in analytic philosophy still dominated how philosophy in general, and ethics in particular, was being done in English-speaking countries in the West. Mandelbaum begins the first chapter explaining that his book goes against a trend in ethics that he thought embraced a false dichotomy of there being two separable disciplines – descriptive and normative – with the upshot that the study of matters normative could be conducted independently of matters descriptive. In particular, he understood the trend as claiming that the study of moral thought and discourse could (and should) be conducted without influence of the sciences, including psychology, sociology, and anthropology. And Mandelbaum thought that this trend was deeply mistaken. Indeed, according to his brand of “critical realism”, which he defended in connection with knowledge of the external world, a proper conception of what that world is like ought to be informed by what the various empirical sciences tell us about it, including what they tell us about human capacities for learning about the world.2 So from the perspective of critical realism, the analytic or linguistic approach made the mistake of trying to deal with moral experience (the proper province of ethics) merely through its reflection in language (p. 15),3 while ignoring important non-linguistic aspects of moral experience that is the proper subject of psychology. Indeed, some of the most fundamental ideas in *Phenomenology* were greatly influenced by the work of gestalt psychologist Wolfgang Köhler to whom Mandelbaum dedicates the book.4 Thus, because his book is partly about moral psychology, the dominance of the “disciplinary divide” tended to put his book outside of then-contemporary debates in ethics.

However, the philosophical climate has since dramatically changed and we now find increasing interest by psychologists in moral experience, as well as the work of empirically minded philosophers making use of empirical results in their theorizing about ethics.5 All of this recent interest in ethics from an empirically informed perspective makes Mandelbaum’s work refreshingly relevant to contemporary work. In the remainder of this section we explain some of the elements of Mandelbaum’s phenomenological ethics, beginning with the aims, method, and scope of his inquiry, followed by a presentation of his phenomenological descriptions of various types of moral experience (and associated judgments).
Aims, method, and scope of a phenomenologically grounded ethics

Mandelbaum defines the general task of ethics as “the attempt to gain a systematic and complete understanding of moral experience” (p. 41). He also refers to particular tasks that moral philosophers have sought to accomplish, in search of system and completeness, including (i) determining whether moral judgments “constitute a single class” and (if so) explaining what differentiates them into species (pp. 37–38) and (ii) discovering a universally valid standard for conduct (pp. 32, 36, 41, 239). In the first chapter of Phenomenology, “The Problem of Method”, Mandelbaum discusses the following four general methods or approaches to ethical inquiry which philosophers have used in attempting to address the various tasks of ethics: metaphysical, psychological, sociological, and phenomenological. The first three approaches each attempt to somehow deduce a valid standard of conduct from premises that express theses from their respective domains. Although he raises objections to each of the three approaches that are peculiar to the approach in question, he objects to them all on the ground that they all suppose that questions of ethics and, in particular, whether there is a universally valid standard for conduct, can be properly addressed without first engaging in what he calls the phenomenological approach – an approach to ethical inquiry that “starts from a point which all paths must eventually cross: a direct examination of the data of men’s moral consciousness” (p. 30).

That leaves the phenomenological approach. But Mandelbaum distinguishes two main versions of this approach: the contentual and the generic approaches, and within the latter, three species. According to a “contentual” phenomenological approach, one begins with what one takes to be the commonly accepted moral opinions of humankind – specifically, the assertive contents of moral judgments – and attempts to “deduce” or draw out of those opinions some universal standard of right conduct. This is essentially the method of reflective equilibrium. Mandelbaum rejects it because he thinks that it is ultimately circular and thus cannot accomplish what it sets out to do (pp. 34, 36, 39–40, 136, 184–85, 241). The circularity problem is that in light of the fact that the assertive contents of some moral judgments are in conflict with those of others, the proponent of this methodology is forced to designate some, from among the vast array of moral judgments, as being “enlightened” or, what these days are called “considered”. But then the worry is that “any moral system which we finally reach [using this methodology] will probably be little more than a formal profession of antecedently held personal beliefs” (p. 35).

The other phenomenological approach, and one that Mandelbaum thinks can avoid objectionable circularity, is what he calls the “generic” approach, which aims “to uncover that which – whatever they assert – all have in common” and thus aims to “discover the generic characteristics of all moral experience” (p. 36). But in abstracting from their assertive content, and in search of some elements of commonality, one might focus on the terms, including “right”, “wrong”, “duty”, “good”, “bad”, and so forth, that moral judgments contain and attempt to determine their meanings and logical interrelations. Granted, to do this is to look to
the contents of moral judgments, but it nevertheless avoids having to determine at the start of ethical inquiry which moral judgments are (at least presumptively) correct or valid. But this “semantic/syntactic” approach is problematic according to Mandelbaum because to determine the meanings and interrelations of these terms in their moral senses, one must first examine how they are used. Whether, for instance, the term, “right”, as used in a moral judgment, purports to refer to some attitude-independent property, rightness, or whether such terms merely signify some attitude being expressed by a speaker, will depend on how judgments employing this term figure in thought and discourse and how they are experienced by those who make them.

Another generic approach would be to abstract from assertive and conceptual contents of moral judgments altogether and consider the sort of psychological attitudes involved when people make moral judgments. This sort of “attitudinal” approach is characteristic of non-cognitivists who, like A. J. Ayer, C. L. Stevenson, and R. M. Hare, stressed what in speech act terms are the “illocutionary” and “perlocutionary” features of moral thought and discourse. But Mandelbaum thinks that the history of attempts to locate some specific attitude that is the generic mark of all moral judgments has resulted in accounts that are “either arbitrary or unconvincing” (p. 40). What Mandelbaum then proposes, as a proper phenomenological approach to ethical inquiry, is what he calls a “structural approach to the problem of generic nature of moral judgments”.

What characterizes this approach is the fact that it treats moral experience as a complete judgmental act. Not only are the attitudes which are present and the content which is affirmed to be considered, but it is crucial for such an approach to examine each of these in relation to the situation in which the judgment is made. Therefore, instead of abstracting either content or attitude from the total situation, we shall first inquire into the manner in which a situation appears to one who makes the moral judgment; we shall then attempt to interpret the other two elements in terms of their relationship to this situation.

(p. 40)

The “complete judgmental act”, then, involves the content of the judgment, the psychological attitudes that are present at the time of the judgment, and the relation between these two aspects as well as between them and what Mandelbaum calls the “situation” or “circumstances” in which the judgment is made. The situation is understood as those “initial conditions that call forth our action . . . [and include] not merely the present conditions which we find ourselves confronting, but those past and future events which we recognize as being relevant to the choice which we are to make” (p. 61). How exactly this structural approach is to proceed is not made clear in the above quote; nor does Mandelbaum say anything more illuminating about it. He does think that this approach may not only provide a “richer” understanding of the nature of moral judgments, but that one might be able to make progress on the particular ethical task of discovering some
universally valid principles of right conduct (pp. 42–43). In any case, one can gain a better understanding of the structural phenomenological method by seeing how Mandelbaum puts it into practice in his descriptions of types of moral experience, to which we turn shortly.

The title of the book refers to the phenomenology of moral experience, although Mandelbaum by and large focuses his attention on moral judgments. This requires brief comment.

Let us distinguish between what we call “judgment-involving” moral experiences and the sorts of putative non-judgment-involving moral experiences that Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus call “ethical comportment.” Even if there are such cases of ethical comportment (which we think is dubious), it is important to note that Mandelbaum is explicit about using the term “judgment” in a deliberately broad sense to include cases in which one “immediately sees – or so one believes – the rightness or wrongness of that which is contemplated” (p. 46). Such cases are contrasted with those in which one infers a moral judgment from premises. Call cases of the former sort “intuitive” moral judgments and those of the latter sort “inferred” moral judgments. As we shall see, much of Mandelbaum’s phenomenological description is concerned with intuitive judgment-involving moral experiences. But, the main point here is that the scope of judgment-involving moral experiences is quite broad even if not exhaustive.

Mandelbaum claims that the “primary data of ethics are to be found among the normative [and in particular moral] judgments people make. And surely this is plausible. Whether one is engaged in normative ethics or in metaethics, moral judgments are in some sense of primary interest, the “data” with which one begins. (Think of normative moral theories of right conduct that purport to systematize common sense moral judgments. Think also of attempts in metaethics to analyze the meanings of moral judgments.) But it is important to notice that Mandelbaum’s phenomenological method treats moral experience as involving a complete judgmental act (see above quote) and furthermore with respect to the aim of “understanding man’s moral experience, an ethical inquiry must constantly cross and recross the boundary between what is asserted by a moral judgment and the psychological aspects of the judgmental act” (p. 39). So even though Mandelbaum focuses his discussion of moral experience on what he calls moral judgments, for reasons we have just mentioned, he is concerned with all aspects of those experiences which include the having or the making of a moral judgment.9

Having argued for his structural phenomenological approach to ethics, Mandelbaum proceeds in Chapters 2–4 to explore the phenomenology of various types of moral experience, and then in the final two chapters he explores the various sources of moral disputes (Ch. 5) and, on the basis of his phenomenological inquiry, considers the extent to which such disputes can be resolved (Ch. 6). In the remainder of this part of the chapter, we will concentrate on Mandelbaum’s descriptions of moral experience, beginning with his taxonomy.
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**Taxonomy of moral experience**

Mandelaumberg distinguishes two main types of moral experience (and corresponding moral judgment): direct and removed. Direct moral experiences are ones in which an agent is immediately confronted with a situation that she takes to involve a choice on her part to either perform or refrain from performing some action (in that situation) that is experienced as morally required. The sorts of moral judgments embedded in such experiences are judgments of obligation (duty, right, wrong) and are distinguished by three features. First, the moral judgments in question are made from an agentive perspective – from the perspective of the agent who confronts the situation and makes a morally significant choice. Second, they exclusively concern what Mandelaumberg calls “willed actions” – actions that are consciously undertaken for some consciously entertained purpose. Third, such experiences and judgments involve an emotional element that is “experienced as a state of the self and is directly related to action” (p. 127). (We will have more to say about these elements in the sections to follow.)

By contrast, removed moral judgments are made from a spectator’s perspective and include experiences in which one judges the rightness or wrongness of the actions of one’s past self or someone else. They also include experiences in which one makes evaluative judgments about the goodness and badness of character traits or overall character of oneself or others. Removed judgments of right and wrong are not restricted to willed actions, but are properly directed toward spontaneous actions (e.g. habitual actions), and although such experiences (and judgments) may be accompanied by emotional reactions such as admiration, disgust, anger, praise, and so forth, when they are present “they appear as by-products of our acts of moral apprehension, and not [as in the case with direct moral experiences] direct manifestations of what are experienced to be motivational forces” (p. 127).

The direct/removed distinction organizes Mandelaumberg’s phenomenological inquiry. Chapter 2 is devoted to direct moral judgments, while Chapters 3 and 4 treat respectively removed judgments of right and wrong and removed judgments of moral worth. In each of these chapters, Mandelaumberg, by applying his structural approach, is looking for generic characteristics that are common to each of the types of experience/judgment, with the further aim of determining whether there are any generic features common to all species of moral experience/judgment.

We turn now to some of the details of Mandelaumberg’s phenomenological descriptions of direct and removed moral experiences, with special attention to the experiences of the former type, since, in the second part of the chapter, we will be focusing exclusively on this species of moral experience.

**The phenomenology of direct moral experiences**

We begin with a couple of examples of direct moral experiences.

*Valerie’s volunteering.* In her local newspaper, Valerie reads about the city’s call for volunteers for a community project to help south-side citizens (whose
neighborhood has been ravaged by a tornado) do some neighborhood clearing and cleaning up. Valerie calls the contact number and agrees to help this coming Saturday morning. But when Saturday comes along, she is not in the mood to participate; she would much rather take it easy. She considers just not showing up, thinking that because of the many volunteers likely to show up, her not showing would not make a noticeable dent in the clean-up effort. But, she thinks, “once I get out there, maybe I’ll perk up and it won’t be so bad, and besides, I did say I’d help, so I really ought to get ready and just go.” With that thought she looks for her garden gloves that she will need for the job.

Don’s donation. Ambitious and successful Don lives comfortably in his upscale Manhattan condo. One day he receives a letter in the mail requesting money on behalf of Doctors without Borders, an international humanitarian aid organization that he has heard of (from listening to NPR), but whose mission he has never thought about. Typically, he just automatically pitches such mail along with grocery store flyers, credit card offers, 20 percent off coupons from Bed, Bath and Beyond, and other such “junk”. But for no particular reason, he opens this particular donation request letter and reads about the recent and not so recent tragic events from around the world that have left people in desperate need of medical aid. Moved by the reports contained in the letter, he decides to do a bit more exploring by going to the organization’s web site where he listens to radio broadcasts, watches videos, and reads more about the needs of people across the globe. He has not made charitable donations in the past – it never seriously entered his mind – but now he is thinking about it. He thinks about his own well-being and reflects on the kind of luck he has had throughout his life, compared to the unlucky circumstances of people living in hostile circumstances. As he mulls this over, he thinks, “Well, I don’t have to give – and besides, don’t I pay taxes some of which goes to foreign aid? But I really should give something and do it now; so that’s what I will do.” Don clicks the “donate” button on the main menu of the website, then selects the “donate stock” option and makes a generous stock donation.

These stories include bare psychological sketches of the experiences of the characters they feature; they do not include descriptions of any feelings or other psychological phenomena that Valerie and Don may each experience as they consider the performance versus the non-performance of the actions they contemplate and finally come to make a choice. In particular, we have omitted mention of any aspects of their occurrent conscious experience that may accompany their moral ought/should-judgments as they decide what to do – to help with a community project in one case, donate in the other. Nor do they include descriptions of thoughts and feelings that the characters may have experienced in imagining not doing what they each end up deciding to do. But these sorts of elements are part of people’s common everyday moral experiences and they are reflected in Mandelbaum’s nuanced treatment of such cases. According to
Mandelbaum, ordinary judgments of direct obligation can be properly described as involving “two layers” of introspective awareness. Let us take these up in order.

First, the experience of moral obligation involves a felt demand which is experienced as a kind of force which, he claims, like all forces can only be described by referring to its experienced origin and direction:

It is my contention that the demands which we experience when we make a direct moral judgment are always experienced as emanating from “outside” us, and as being directed against us. They are demands which seem to be independent of us and to which we feel that we ought to respond.

So, for Mandelbaum, the demand that is characteristic of direct moral judgments is “reflexive” – it is directed against the agent making the judgment – and its origin is experienced as independent of the agent. As he goes on to explain, this sense of “independence” is what gives direct moral experiences their “objective feel,” in that the demand appears to come from features of the situation that one confronts and that are themselves independent of one’s desires, preferences, and aversions.

So the first layer of phenomenal description of direct moral experiences is that they involve what the agent (in effect) takes to be objectively grounded reflexive demands. The second layer concerns what one’s experiences reveal (within their phenomenology) about the basis of the felt demand which Mandelbaum identifies as the experientially presented relational characteristic of fittingness (and its counterpart, unfittingness). The idea is that to have or make a direct moral judgment, one experiences a demand upon oneself to perform (or refrain from performing) some particular action (on that occasion), and one experiences this demand as itself based on what is presented to one as an objective relation of fittingness or unfittingness obtaining between such an action and the features of the situation one is confronting. In such situations, one experiences certain features of the environment or situation confronting one as “calling forth” some action on one’s part. To illustrate, let us return to our two examples.

In Valerie’s case, the relevant “situation” she confronts comprises such facts as that she made a particular promise to help with the community project on Saturday, that this is the relevant Saturday, that she is able to keep the promise, and in general that there are no other pressing obligations that compete with the one in question. In contemplating her choice (to go or stay), it is reasonable to suppose (following Mandelbaum) that at one point in her thinking, she feels the pressure of having made a particular promise as she realizes that the time to keep it is upon her. The pressure is experienced as directed toward her coming from the external situation she faces, “external” in the sense that the felt demand to keep the promise is experienced as independent of her desires, inclinations, and preferences; indeed, in her case she experiences the demand as contrary to what she prefers to do. She would prefer to stay home. And, at a more precise level of
description, we can say that Valerie’s feeling a certain pressure to perform a particular series of actions is grounded in her sense of a contemplated relation of fit-ness between the series in question and her situation together with her sense of unfittingness that would obtain were she not to keep her promise.

Don’s case is similar in some respects to Valerie’s, but perhaps not in all. He confronts the situation of being in a position to help distant people in need of medical attention, and experiences the sort of pressure characteristic of a felt external demand that is presumably grounded in his recognition of the fittingness between his donating and people needing medical aid. However, in Don’s case, his situation does not involve having made a promise, nor (arguably) is he under any sort of role obligation that one undertakes as a father, or organization members, and so forth. Put in terms of traditional moral theory, Valerie has a “perfect” or “narrow” obligation – there is some fairly specific action she is to perform, on a fairly specific occasion, on behalf of a fairly specific group. Don, however, has no such specific obligations, even if we assume he has what is called an “imperfect” or “wide” duty of charity. Were Don to think that his donating (to this particular cause, on this particular occasion) were in some sense “up to him” and not strictly required, we might expect that his overall moral phenomenology would differ somewhat from Valerie’s. Mandelbaum does not discuss whatever phenomenological differences might characterize experiences of imperfect obligation, compared to those of perfect obligation. We speculate that in imagining one’s non-performance of some action that would fulfill a perfect duty, one senses (however dimly) that one would appropriately experience guilt and be subject to blame, whereas in cases of imperfect obligation, one might not sense being subject to these reactive attitudes, though perhaps to others.12

Experiences involving a sense of fittingness or unfittingness are thus central to Mandelbaum’s phenomenology of direct moral experience, and they will be the focus of our attention in the second main part of this chapter. But let us first briefly consider Mandelbaum’s descriptions of removed moral experiences.

**The phenomenology of removed moral experiences**

Recall that removed moral judgments are made from a spectator’s perspective, they are either about the rightness or wrongness of the actions of others (including one’s past self) or about the goodness or badness (the moral worth) of a person overall or a particular character trait. Furthermore, removed judgments about rightness and wrongness are not restricted to willed actions; they are also appropriately directed at what someone does spontaneously.

Regarding experiences in which one has or makes a removed moral judgment of rightness (or wrongness), Mandelbaum argues (against what he calls “teleological” or what we now call “consequentialist” moral theories) that the focus of our judgments concerns whether the agent’s action was (or is) a fitting response on her part to the situation she faced (is facing). These judgments are often accompanied by such moral emotions (or attitudes) as admiration, contempt, and disgust, which are experienced as fitting responses to the actions being morally evaluated.
Were Valerie to decide to stay home instead of doing the volunteer work she promised, one would appropriately judge that her doing so was wrong (unfitting) and might consequently experience feelings of disapproval directed toward her non-performance. The phenomenological point Mandelbaum makes is that the moral emotions or attitudes we direct toward the actions (or omissions) of others (including past selves) are “experienced as having their causal ground in what is seen as the rightness or wrongness of the action judged” (p. 126).

Again, in connection with removed judgments of moral worth, Mandelbaum’s view is that “the traditionally recognized virtues are . . . precisely those traits of character which provide fitting answers to the ever-recurring demands that all men face” (p. 150). Thus, the judgment that some trait such as honesty is good, is guided by one’s sense that having this trait prompts those who have it to fittingly respond to situations calling for particular instances of honesty. Similarly, in judging someone to be (overall) a good person we make this judgment on the basis of taking someone “as being guided by an apprehension of objective demands in the situations that confront him” (p. 177).

Recall that one aim of Mandelbaum’s phenomenological inquiry is to discover whether moral experiences/judgments are unified by some common element and thus constitute a single genus. He ends his phenomenological inquiry (in Chapter 4) concluding that “all moral judgments are grounded in our apprehension of relations of fittingness or unfittingness between the responses of a human being and the demands which inhere in the situation by which he is faced” (p. 181). It is this idea of fittingness and unfittingness that are (according to Mandelbaum) central to moral experience that will be the focus of our discussion in the next part of the chapter.

This concludes our exposition of some of the key aspects of Mandelbaum’s phenomenological descriptions of moral experience. We turn now to the meta-ethical questions of moral metaphysics.

The phenomenology of fittingness and moral realism

In this section, we endeavor to evaluate what we call “the argument from introspective phenomenology,” a version of which we find in Mandelbaum’s writings, according to which a form of moral objectivism — moral realism — fits best with the introspectible facts of moral experience. We proceed by first distinguishing among types of moral objectivism, including two forms of moral realism. We then set forth the argument from introspective phenomenology against which we develop a challenge that we think ultimately undermines the argument. We conclude with some brief remarks about how, in light of our irrealist metaethical stance, we propose to understand moral objectivity.

Conceptions of moral objectivity

There are a variety of conceptions of moral objectivity that purport to capture the intuitive idea that morality is in some sense objective. According to an ontological
conception, there is a realm of moral properties and facts that “objectively exist” and which we may discover. This “realist” conception comes in two main forms. According to a robust moral realism, moral properties (including relations) are on an ontological par with primary qualities – their existence and nature is completely mind- (and response-) independent. By contrast, modest forms of moral realism construe moral properties as being like (if not a species of) secondary qualities such as color (given a Lockean view) and so despite being response-dependent, such properties are, as John McDowell puts it, “there to be experienced.”

Another form of moral objectivism is the rationalist conception, according to which moral thought and discourse are subject to methodological constraints which, if properly employed, yield a single set of fundamental moral claims (according to most versions, moral principles). Roderick Firth’s “ideal observer” theory, Michael Smith’s metaethical rationalism, and forms of Kantian constructivism are examples. These views promise a kind of moral objectivity (there is a single set of moral truths) whose attraction is nicely put by Christine Korsgaard: “If ethically good action is simply rational action, we do not need to postulate special ethical properties in the world or faculties in the mind, in order to provide ethics with a foundation.”

Finally, metaethical expressivists attempt to accommodate the idea that morality is objective without postulating moral properties and facts and without supposing that there is some method of reasoning that would lead all impartial inquirers to converge on a single set of moral claims. We will have more to say about this conception below.

The argument from introspective phenomenology

The argument from introspective phenomenology that interests us here appeals to facts about moral experience that are introspectively accessible and uses them as a basis for concluding that such experiences provide evidence in favor of an ontological conception of moral objectivity – to favor some form of moral realism over competing metaethical views. The main competitor in Mandelbaum’s day was non-cognitivism. So there are three main steps in an argument of this sort. First, there is calling attention to those features of moral experience that bear on the issue of moral metaphysics. Second, there is the claim that such features do positively favor (even if only defeasibly) an ontological objectivist conception of moral experience, thought, and discourse. And finally, there is the claim that such elements disfavor a non-ontological objectivist conception of such experience, thought, and discourse. But in addition to these main steps there are five additional features of this sort of argument that are worth bringing into focus.

First, as already noted, the argument only purports to provide pro tanto or defeasible evidence in favor of moral realism, rather than conclusive evidence in favor of such realism. After all, moral thought and experience may carry objectivist ontological purport yet an error theory of such thought and experience may be true.
Second, as lately noted, the argument may be used in defense of either a robust or modest form of moral realism.

Third, the argument is supposed to be a distinctive form of argument, and so one that differs from other more theoretical arguments in favor of moral realism that would appeal to semantic, metaphysical, or epistemological premises.

Fourth, the argument assumes that people by and large do share a common phenomenology whose elements can provide a pre-theoretical basis to which a theorist might appeal in attempting to adjudicate certain metaethical disputes. If, for instance, people’s moral phenomenology was deeply and thoroughly theory-laden, appealing to their moral experiences would not be suitable as a basis for favoring one over another moral theory.

Fifth and finally, the argument is based on an appeal to what is available to introspection and thus an argument that bids its audience to engage in introspection in an effort to detect whether or not one’s moral experiences carry moral realist purport. And here it is important to notice that there are three possibilities.

**Affirmative:** It is an introspectively accessible fact that moral experiences do carry ontological objectivist purport that favor ontological objectivist metaethical views over competing metaethical views.

**Negative:** It is an introspectively accessible fact that moral experiences do not carry such ontological objectivist purport.

**Neutrality:** It is not introspectively accessible whether or not moral experiences carry ontological objectivist purport. (And if not, this does not show that such experiences do not carry such purport, only that whatever such purport they do have is something that will require theoretical considerations to affirm.)

The argument in question, then, is used to defend Affirmative. Below, we make a case for Neutrality. But before getting to that, let us return briefly to Mandelbaum’s text to see how he marshals the argument from introspective phenomenology in favor of some form of moral realism and against non-cognitivism.

As mentioned above, this form of argument involves three main steps, the first of which is to present those features of moral experience that have bearing on questions of moral metaphysics. In presenting Mandelbaum’s descriptions of types of moral experience – direct and removed – we have stressed the objectivist-seeming aspects of those experiences. To briefly review: in various passages, Mandelbaum describes moral experience (and corresponding moral judgments) as involving an “apprehension of a fittingness between a specific envisioned action and the situation” (p. 69) where the fittingness relation is experienced as being an external relation whose nature and existence are independent of one’s preferences and interests. He also refers to fittingness (as presented in moral experience) as a “phenomenally objective relational characteristic” (p. 61, our emphasis), that is, a feature of our experience that presents itself as being an objectively existing relation. Elsewhere, he notes that “when making a moral judgment we feel that we have apprehended a genuine property of the action which we have judged” (p. 183,
our emphasis), and refers to the fact that people’s moral experiences involve the strong conviction that “moral qualities in actions inhere in these actions” (p. 191, our emphasis, cf. p. 218). These ways of describing moral experience, taken at face value, seem to support some form of moral realism. So, the second step of the argument from introspection – making a case for a realist moral metaphysics – is apparently accomplished by proper phenomenological description.

We note also that the way in which Mandelbaum handles his phenomenological case for moral realism fits perfectly with the various lately noted general characteristics of this form of argument. For instance, Mandelbaum is properly cautious about what one may conclusively infer from moral experiences (p. 58), since it might turn out that moral experiences are systematically misleading in what they purport to represent, and so an ontological error theory in ethics is not excluded by the argument from introspective phenomenology. Furthermore, the argument may be offered in favor of either a robust or a modest form of moral realism. It is not clear in Mandelbaum which form of moral realism his use of the argument favors (if either form); as we said he is cautious about what particular metaphysical conclusion one might draw from the facts of introspective phenomenology.18 And for our purposes, it does not matter which form of realism is featured in this type of argument. Mandelbaum also presents his case for moral objectivism as distinct from more theoretical arguments – this is in keeping with the overall methodology of the book. So, for instance, he does not appeal to considerations of moral explanation or the fact that moral judgments can be embedded in, for example, logically complex constructions – the sorts of theoretical considerations that contemporary moral realists use to defend moral realism. And throughout his book Mandelbaum does assume that there is a pre-theoretical core of moral experience that people by and large share, and at various places in the book he bids his readers to appeal to their own experience to verify his own introspective observations.

The third step in the argument is to show that the features of moral experience being cited favor moral objectivism over competing non-objectivist metaethical views. As we have said, for Mandelbaum this meant pointing out how various elements of moral experience do not fit well with a non-cognitivist construal of moral thought and experience. According to the non-cognitivist of Mandelbaum’s day, moral judgments are psychological states other than belief – expressions of emotion for emotivists, a type of command for prescriptivists. But, according to Mandelbaum, moral judgments are commonly experienced as beliefs. Furthermore, according to Mandelbaum, if moral experience were to fit a non-cognitivist account of moral experience and judgment, then we ought to experience certain affective states as giving rise to our moral judgments. So, for instance, with respect to direct moral experience, were the non-cognitivist view to accurately reflect those experiences, then one ought to experience the felt demand (an affective-motivational state) as the ground of one’s sense that an action is fittingly or unfittingly related to the situation in question. But if Mandelbaum’s description of direct moral experiences is correct, it is the other way round. And with respect to removed moral experiences, again, a non-cognitivist construal inverts the
proper phenomenological ordering of the elements of such experience. Such experiences, recall, are often accompanied by such emotions as indignation, admiration, or other moral emotions. In such cases,

it does actually appear that the emotion was aroused by the qualities which we apprehended in the action which we judged. To hold [along with non-cognitivists] that we “first” feel indignation, and that we therefore judge that the action was wrong, seems to distort the nature of our experience.

(p. 213, cf. p. 256)

Thus, according to Mandelbaum’s version of the argument from introspection, the facts of both direct and removed moral experience (and judgment) favor an ontological objectivist construal of such experience and judgment over a non-cognitivist construal, which denies ontological objectivism.

As we have said, we agree with Mandelbaum’s phenomenological objections to forms of non-cognitivism, but we want to block his attempt to defend the Affirmative thesis mentioned above; instead we defend Neutrality. Our plan for doing so involves two main steps. First, we describe a metaethical view that we have elsewhere defended, “cognitivist expressivism,” that denies moral realism. Second, we will zero in on the main features of the phenomenology of direct moral experience as characterized by Mandelbaum, asking of them whether alone or in combination they carry ontological objectivist purport that is manifest to introspection. The idea is that if our irrealist cognitivist expressivism can smoothly accommodate the introspectible facts of moral experiences, then those facts do not provide pro tanto evidence in favor of moral realism – those facts do not carry ontological objectivist purport that is available to introspection. Thus, we argue against Affirmative and hence attempt to block the central move in the argument from introspective phenomenology. Our argument however will not strictly establish Neutrality, since we will not have ruled out Negative. However, our argument, together with the assumption (that we are happy to grant) that metaethical views that affirm moral realism are also compatible with the introspectible facts of moral phenomenology, does confirm Neutrality.

The challenge

Expressivist views in ethics deny that there are moral properties and facts and are thus opposed to moral realism. Such views also deny that moral judgments are descriptive beliefs – beliefs whose contents purport to ascribe moral properties (including relations) to items of evaluation and thus purport to describe some moral way the world is. Old-time non-cognitivism, according to which moral judgments are merely expressions of emotion or commands or express some other non-belief attitude are versions of what we may call non-cognitivist expressivism. However, according to the version we embrace, cognitivist expressivism, moral judgments do express beliefs, although, according to this view, there are two distinct species of belief – descriptive and evaluative. Moral ought-judgments, on
this view, are or express evaluative beliefs. To explain further, let us consider the generic model of belief upon which cognitivist expressivism is based. According to the generic model in question, beliefs are commitment states directed toward a descriptive way the world might be content. One species of commitment—an is-commitment—is exemplified by such beliefs as that Valerie is helping with the community project. One who (at some particular time t) has this belief is is-committed (at t) to a particular descriptive way the world might content, that Valerie helps with the community project. Call such commitments “descriptive beliefs.” However, cognitivist expressivism recognizes ought-commitments—a species of genuine belief that shares many of the functional role and phenomenological features of descriptive beliefs—but instead of being is-committed to a descriptive way the world might be, in having or making such commitments one is ought-committed with respect to a non-moral way the world might be. Thus, in thinking or uttering the sentence “Valerie ought to help with the community project,” one is expressing an ought-commitment directed toward the non-moral descriptive content: that Valerie helps with the community project. Call this an evaluative belief. The important thing to notice here is that the descriptive content toward which the ought-commitment is directed is a non-moral way the world might be. More conventional notions of belief recognize only descriptive beliefs, which entail that for a psychological state to be a moral belief that state must be an is-commitment directed toward a moral way the world might be. Thus, the belief about Valerie would have to be understood as a matter of being is-committed to the following putative descriptive state of affairs: that it ought to be that Valerie helps with the community project. And then for this belief to be true there would have to exist moral ought-to-be properties. However, according to the generic framework of belief we have just sketched, evaluative beliefs are fully compatible with the denial that moral beliefs purport to represent a moral way the world might be—fully compatible that is with the denial that moral beliefs carry ontological objectivist (realist) purport.

So the challenge we pose to the argument from introspective phenomenology is this. Cognitivist expressivism is a metaethical view that we have defended elsewhere and represents a consistent, stable metaethical position. Whether or not it is true, it represents a position that accommodates the idea that moral judgments are genuine beliefs, yet denies that they carry ontological objectivist moral purport. Now, based on introspective evidence, it seems clear that moral judgments are best interpreted as a species of belief—something the non-cognitivists had to deny. So, if the phenomenological argument in question is to provide pro tanto evidence that favors moral realism over cognitivist expressivism, its advocates need to pinpoint those introspectible features of moral experience that carry moral realist purport.

The phenomenology of fittingness

We think that Mandelbaum’s description of the various types of judgment-involving moral experience is fairly accurate. For the sake of simplicity we focus
here on the phenomenology of direct moral experiences. Following Mandelbaum’s description of such experiences, we have seen that they involve three notable aspects:

**Belief-component**: experiences of direct moral obligation involve ought-judgments that are belief-like.

**Felt demand**: the ought-judgment in question is part of an overall experience in which one experiences a felt demand whose elements include (i) a feeling of pressure, (ii) a sense of a vector-like force which is directed toward oneself and has an “external” origin, and (iii) a motivational pull toward either performing or not performing the action being contemplated.

“**Apprehension**” of fittingness/unfittingness: the felt demand is grounded phenomenologically in a sense of the action or omission being fittingly or unfittingly related to one’s present situation.

Do any of these features alone or in combination provide pro tanto evidence for moral realism? We have already noted that cognitivist expressivism accommodates the first aspect—that moral experiences involve judgments that are beliefs. What, then, about the other two?

Consider felt demand. Neither the affective aspect nor the motivational aspect carry realist purport. Merely feeling a pressure to perform (or refrain from performing) some action does not carry such purport, and neither does feeling pull to do or not do something. After all, one might feel strongly tempted to eat a delicious looking piece of cake which I experience as tugging me in its direction. But such motivational pull does not carry realist purport: one’s experience here is not as of the piece of cake having the objective property of ought to be eaten.

In any case, the crucial aspect of felt demand is the “external” origin of the vector-like force—the fact that the demand is, as Mandelbaum says, “emanating from outside us,” which he glosses as being independent of one’s desires. And, as noted, this sense of felt demand is experienced as being grounded in one’s sense of what would be fitting or unfitting. In some places, Mandelbaum puts the point by noting that when confronting a moral choice, one experiences the particular situation in question as “calling for” a certain action or omission. Thus, if direct moral experiences carry ontological objectivist purport, and do so in a way that is introspectively manifest, then such purport would seem to be located in the following complex experience: a concrete action being called for by desire-independent features of one’s present circumstances.

To establish the Neutrality thesis, what we need to show is that cognitivist expressivism can accommodate the introspectively manifest features of moral experience just described at least as well as can a view that attributes objective ontological purport to such experiences. We now proceed to sketch two interpretations—a cognitivist-expressivist interpretation and an ontological-objectivist interpretation—in order to make clear how they each purport to account for Mandelbaumian direct moral experiences.
Two interpretations of fittingness experiences

So let us focus on what is involved phenomenologically in a concrete action being called for by desire-independent features of one’s present circumstances. Note first that direct moral experiences involve coming to have or make a moral ought-judgment in what we call a “non-self-privileging” manner. That is, one responds to considerations that have to do not with one’s preferences, desires, or inclinations, but rather with those having to do with not harming or interfering (in various ways) with others.\(^{19}\)

But the crucial idea is this: in coming to have or make an ought-judgment, one experiences oneself as:

1. becoming (or being) ought-committed to doing (or omitting) some action in a non-self-privileging way; and
2. becoming (or being) so ought-committed because of certain objective non-moral but normatively relevant factual considerations.

In Valerie’s case, she is aware of certain objective non-moral features of her present circumstance (having promised to help with clean-up and now is the time to keep that promise), and she thereby experiences herself as being ought-committed to a certain series of actions (getting ready, traveling to the relevant destination, and helping out), but she experiences her becoming ought-committed because of the non-moral objective features and in a non-self-privileging manner. Direct experiences of moral obligation, we submit, involving experiencing the coming to be (or being) ought-committed in a non-self-privileging manner to a certain line of conduct because of the presence of certain objective non-moral considerations.

It is important to notice that according to this picture, there are two crucial steps in direct moral judgments that are conceptually distinguishable, even if experientially the entire experience is seamless. And the crucial point to appreciate, in distinguishing this non-ontological picture from an ontological picture, is the second step – the coming to be committed because step. Here, it is important to notice that the “because” is not simply a causal “because.” To construe it this way would be to confuse matters of causal explanation with matters of normativity. So what this picture holds is that the second step involves what we may refer to as a reasonish-because way of coming to have an ought-commitment.

Let us now relate what we have been saying about direct moral experiences to Mandelbaum and the idea that such experiences are grounded in a sense of an action’s being fitting (or unfitting). As we noted above, the idea of an action’s fitting a certain situation is the idea of there being certain objective, non-moral considerations that partly constitute that situation as “calling for” or counting as decisive reasons in favor of the action in question. And the idea operating in our two-step construal is that in coming to judge that one is ought-committed to some course of action on the basis of taking that action to be fittingly (or most fittingly) related to one’s present situation just is to become ought-committed in
a non-self-privileging manner because of certain objective non-moral considerations present in one’s situation.

Now compare this two-step interpretation of what is involved in experiences where a certain action is called for by desire-independent features of one’s situation with the sort of three-step interpretation presupposed by an ontological objectivist picture. Referring again to Valerie’s case, we have these steps:

1. apprehending some objective, non-normative, fact(s) (having promised to help with clean-up and now is the time to keep that promise);
2. apprehending an objective fittingness-fact (her engaging in a series of actions beginning now would constitute the most fitting response to her present situation); and
3. becoming ought-committed to some objective non-normative way the world might be (her getting ready to leave, etc.) by virtue of step (2).

On our interpretation there is no such step (2). Although Valerie does indeed apprehend her having promised to help with the clean-up project as a reason to do so, such reason-apprehension is constituted by becoming ought-committed in the manner described in the preceding paragraph. And that is a two-step process (albeit a process involving substantial phenomenological unity): (a) apprehending her having made the promise and now being to the time to keep it; and (b) becoming ought-committed to her performing a series of actions in a way that is both non-self-privileging and reasonishwise based upon step (a).

We submit that both interpretations are fully compatible with the introspectible facts of direct moral experiences as described by Mandelbaum.20 If this is right, then the argument from introspective phenomenology fails. That argument, recall, rests on the claim that only an ontological objectivist construal of moral experiences fits with the introspectible data of concrete moral experience—in particular with the fact that in coming to have or make a moral judgment, one’s overall experience is grounded in a sense of fittingness. The phenomenology of fittingness (and unfittingness) we claim underdetermines (at least so far as what is introspectively manifest reveals) whether such experiences carry objectivist realist purport.

Expressivist objectivity

We think Mandelbaum was correct in thinking that the facts of moral phenomenology count against old-time crude versions of metaethical non-cognitivism. And we furthermore agree that moral experience (and moral judgment) purport to be in some sense objective. Exactly what all is involved in the “objective pretensions” of moral experience is not a matter we can discuss here. However, we can briefly mention some respects in which our cognitivist expressivism accommodates certain of those pretensions.

Consider the “objective feel” of direct moral experiences that Mandelbaum describes. Can our view make sense of this sort of feel? We think so. First, as we
have lately noted, in coming to judge that one is ought-committed, one experiences oneself as being so committed in a non-self-privileging manner, as taking an impartial stance that does not unduly privilege oneself. Furthermore, in judging that one is ought-committed, one experiences oneself as coming to be so committed in a reasonish-because manner. So, in such experiences one experiences oneself as judging from an impartial, non-self-privileging, reason-grounded manner. This manner of ought-judgment stands in sharp contrast to cases in which one judges on the basis of self-interest that one ought or ought not to engage in some course of action.21

Conclusion

We have been concerned with a particular argument that we find being used today in debates over moral objectivity – the argument from introspective phenomenology. To get to the bottom of this argument, one needs to sort out the details of moral experiences. We have argued that although Mandelbaum’s use of the argument against certain forms of non-cognitivism is sound, sophisticated versions of expressivism can accommodate the phenomenological data at least as well as can realist views. So we think the argument ultimately fails as an argument for realism over all other sorts of irrealist metaethical views.

Nevertheless, Mandelbaum’s Phenomenology is the only single-author text we know of that is devoted primarily to the study of the what-it-is-likeness of moral experience, and we find his characterizations of various types of moral experience illuminating and (for the most part) plausible. Moreover, we agree with Mandelbaum that all ethical theorizing, whether in normative ethics or metaethics, must come to terms with the phenomenology of moral experience.

Notes

3 All references to Mandelbaum’s Phenomenology will be incorporated into the text.
6 It is worth pointing out what Mandelbaum notes when he introduces what he is calling the phenomenological approach, namely, that he is not referring to “the specific methods of the phenomenological school.” Rather (he goes on to say),
I use “phenomenology” to connote any examination of experience or of experienced objects which aims at describing their nature rather than seeking to give an “explanation” of them. The origin of an experience or object, a physiological or physical theory of its characteristics, or a discussion of its ontological status, are thus excluded from phenomenology. What is included is every descriptive interpretation of “the phenomenal world”, that is, of whatever is directly experienced by me or by others.

According to David R. Cerbone, “Insularity or Continuity? Phenomenology and Critical Realism,” (this volume, Ch. 4), the phenomenological school (which included such figures as Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty) embraced what he calls the theses of “autonomy” and “authority” – theses regarding which Mandelbaum’s approach in Phenomenology is, so far as we can tell, officially neutral.

This is a description of the situation or circumstances involved in “direct” moral judgments. See below. It should also be noted that there is some unclarity regarding how one is to understand a person’s situation as Mandelbaum describes it. In specifying this aspect of moral experience, Mandelbaum says that they [the situations] include elements of the past and future, and such states of the self [e.g. that one feels hostility toward another person], so long as the agent is aware of them and feels them to be relevant to the choice which he finds himself called upon to make.

Talk of elements of which one is aware and (in the quoted passage to which this note is appended) and which one recognizes as being relevant suggests that the so-called situation of choice comprises elements that do obtain – facts having to do with past, future, and self. But talk of elements that one feels to be relevant, together with the fact that Mandelbaum is engaged in phenomenological description, strongly suggests that what he is calling one’s situation comprises those considerations which one believes to be relevant to one’s choice, whether or not one’s beliefs are accurate.


Until recently, analytic philosophers of mind tended to accept the idea that intentional psychological states such as beliefs lack any sort of what-it-is-likeness (phenomenology), and that only such sensory states as tickles, tastes, looks, smells, and so forth have a phenomenology. In recent years, however, this has changed and we now find many philosophers of mind arguing that intentional states do have a proprietary phenomenology. See, for example, Galen Strawson, Mental Reality (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984) and “Intentionality and Experience: Terminological Preliminaries,” in D. W. Smith and A. Thomason, eds, Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), Terry Horgan and John Tienson, “The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality,” in David Chalmers, ed., Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 520–33; Terry Horgan, John Tienson, and George Graham, “Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat,” in Richard Schantz, ed., The Externalist Challenge (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2004), 297–317; Uriah Kriegel, “Consciousness as Sensory Quality and as Implicit Self-Awareness,” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (2003: 1–26; David Pitt, “The Phenomenology of Cognition or What is it Like to Think That P?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2004): 1–36.


that the relational notion of fittingness is irreducible and cannot be reductively defined, but he does think one can do more to illuminate the notion than (as in the case of certain other indefinables) merely pointing to single instances. He notes that one can "indicate classes of fittingness (for example, 'completion') in which the essential nature of the relation is apparent" and one can call attention to correlated phenomena such as particular experiences of satisfaction (in cases where one is aware of the fittingness relation being realized) in specifying the relation (61, 63). Furthermore, unlike Broad and Ross, he does not think that there is a unique type of moral fittingness that distinguishes it from relations of fittingness that figure in non-moral demands (71).

12 Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, "You ought to be Ashamed of Yourself (When You violate an Imperfect obligation),” *Philosophical Issues* 15 (2005): 193–208, argues that violations of perfect duty call for guilt on the part of the agent while violations of imperfect duty call for shame on the part of the agent.


17 We here set aside phenomenological arguments in favor of a rationalist version of moral objectivism, partly for reasons of space, but also because such arguments tend to appeal to the phenomenology of moral deliberation rather than the phenomenology of concrete moral experience of the sort Mandelbaum was interested in studying.

18 This caution is particularly evident in *Phenomenology* on p. 58.

19 Here we are focusing on direct moral experiences of obligations to others, setting aside obligations to self.

20 This claim is more fully defended in our What Does Moral Phenomenology Tell Us?"


References


