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EDUCATION: B.A., Philosophy, Stanford University, 1970
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EMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE:

Professor of Philosophy, University of Arizona, 8/02 -
Professor of Philosophy, University of Memphis, 7/88 – 6/02
Chairman, Department of Philosophy, Memphis State University, 9/85-8/86
Associate Professor of Philosophy, Memphis State University, 9/81-6/88
Visiting Associate Professor of Philosophy, University of Houston, 9/80-6/81
Associate Professor of Philosophy, Illinois State University, 7/80-7/81
Visiting Assistant Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan, 5/79-6/79
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Illinois State University, 9/78-6/80
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, DePauw University, 9/73-6/78

AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST: Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Psychology,
Epistemology, Philosophy of Language, Metaethics

AREAS OF COMPETENCE: Philosophy of Science, Logic, Decision Theory

ARTICLES:

1. Reduction and the Mind-Body Problem, in M. Marx and F. Goodson, eds., *Theories in Contemporary Psychology*, 2nd edition (1976), 223-31.
2. Lehrer on 'Could'-Statements, *Philosophical Studies* 32 (1977), 403-11.
3. The Case Against Events, *Philosophical Review* 87 (1978), 28-47. Reprinted in R. Casati and A. Varzi, eds., *The International Research Library of Philosophy: Events* (Dartmouth, 1996).
4. Supervenient Bridge Laws, *Philosophy of Science* 45 (1978), 227-49.
5. 'Could', Possible Worlds, and Moral Responsibility, *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 17 (1979), 345-58.
6. Humean Causation and Kim's Theory of Events, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 10 (1980), 663-79.
7. Nonrigid Event-Designators and the Modal Individuation of Events, *Philosophical Studies* 37 (1980), 341-51.
8. Action Theory Without Actions, *Mind* 60 (1981), 406-14.
9. Counterfactuals and Newcomb's Problem, *Journal of Philosophy* 78 (1981), 331-56. Reprinted in *The Philosopher's Annual, 1981*, and in R. Campbell and L. Sowden (eds.), *Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation* (U. of British Columbia Press, 1985).
10. Token Physicalism, Supervenience, and the Generality of Physics, *Synthese* 49 (1981), 395-413.
11. Intentional and Unintentional Actions (with M. Gorr), *Philosophical Studies* 41 (1982), 251-62.
12. Substitutivity and the Causal Connective, *Philosophical Studies* 42 (1982), 47-52.
13. Supervenience and Microphysics, *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 63 (1982), 29-43. To be reprinted in J. Kim, ed., *The International Research Library of Philosophy: Supervenience*

- (Ashgate).
14. Functionalism, Qualia, and the Inverted Spectrum, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 44 (1984), 453-69.
 15. Functionalism and Token Physicalism, *Synthese* 59 (1984), 321-38.
 16. Jackson on Physical Information and Qualia, *Philos. Quarterly* 34 (1984), 147-52. Reprinted in F. Jackson (ed.), *International Research Library of Philosophy: Consciousness* (Ashgate, 1998); in Neil Campbell, ed., *Mental Causation & the Metaphysics of Mind* (Broadview Press, 2003); in P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa, and D. Stoljar, eds., *Something about Mary: Essays on Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument* (MIT Press, 2004); and in T. Alter and R. Howell, eds., *Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem: A Reader* (Oxford, 2012). German translation in S. Walter and H. D. Heckmann (eds.), *Phänomenales Bewußtsein: Ausgewählte Beiträge zur Qualia-Debatte 1975-1998* (mentis-Publishers, Paderborn, Germany, 2001).
 17. Science Nominalized, *Philosophy of Science* 51 (1984), 529-49.
 18. Supervenience and Cosmic Hermeneutics, *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 22 (1984), Supplement Issue on Supervenience, 19-38.
 19. Against the Token Identity Theory (with Michael Tye), in E. LePore and B. McLaughlin, eds., *Act and Event: The Philosophy of Donald Davidson* (Basil Blackwell, 1985), 427-43.
 20. Compatibilism and the Consequence Argument, *Phil. Studies* 47 (1985), 339-56.
 21. Folk Psychology is Here to Stay (with James Woodward), *Philosophical Review* 94 (1985), 197-226. Reprinted in W. Lycan, ed., *Mind and Cognition: A Reader* (Blackwell, 1990); in J. Greenwood, ed., *The Future of Folk Psychology: Intentionality and Cognitive Science* (Cambridge, 1991); in S. Christensen and D. Turner, eds., *Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind* (Erlbaum, 1993); in W. Lycan, ed., *Mind and Cognition: An Anthology* (Oxford, in press); and in J. Crumley, ed., *Problems in Mind: Readings in Contemporary Philosophy of Mind* (Mayfield, 1999).
 22. Newcomb's Problem: A Stalemate, in R. Campbell and L. Sowden, eds., *Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation* (U. of British Columbia Press), 1985, 223-34.
 23. Psychologism, Semantics, and Ontology, *Nous* 20 (1986), 21-31.
 24. Truth and Ontology, *Philosophical Papers* 15 (1986), 1-21.
 25. Cognition is Real, *Behaviorism* 15 (1987), 13-25.
 26. Psychologistic Semantics and Moral Truth, *Philosophical Studies* 52 (1987), 357-70.
 27. Science Nominalized Properly, *Philosophy of Science* 54 (1987), 281-82.
 28. Supervenient Qualia, *Philosophical Review* 96 (1987), 491-520. Reprinted in *The Philosopher's Annual*, 1987.
 29. Braving the Perils of an Uneventful World (with Michael Tye), *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 31 (1988), 179-186.
 30. How to be Realistic About Folk Psychology (with G. Graham), *Philosophical Psychology* 1 (1988), 69-81.
 31. Settling into a New Paradigm (with J. Tienson), *Spindel Conference 1987: Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind*, *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 26, Supplement (1988), 97-114. Reprinted in T. Horgan and J. Tienson (eds.), *Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind* (Kluwer, 1991).
 32. Attitudinatives, *Linguistics and Philosophy* 12 (1989), 133-65.
 33. Mental Quausation, *Philosophical Perspectives* 3 (1989), 47-76.
 34. Predecision Processes in Chess: Masters, Experts, and Novices, (3rd author, with D. Horgan, K. Millis, and R. Niemyer), in D. Topping et. al., eds., *Thinking Across Cultures* (Erlbaum, 1989), 309-21.
 35. Representations without Rules (with J. Tienson), *Phil. Topics* 17 (1989), 27-43.
 36. Connectionism and the Kuhnian Crisis in Cognitive Science (with J. Tienson), *Acta Analytica* 6 (1990), 5-17.

37. Soft Laws (with J. Tienson), *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 15 (1990), 256-79.
38. Psychologistic Semantics, Robust Vagueness, and the Philosophy of Language, in S. L. Tsohatzidis, ed., *Meanings and Prototypes: Studies in Linguistic Categorization* (Routledge, 1990), 535-57.
39. Actions, Reasons, and the Explanatory Role of Content, in B. McLaughlin, ed., *Dretske and His Critics* (Basil Blackwell, 1991), 73-101.
40. In Defense of Southern Fundamentalism (with G. Graham), *Philosophical Studies* 62 (1991), 107-34. Reprinted in S. Christensen and D. Turner, eds., *Folk Psychology and the Philosophy of Mind* (Erlbaum, 1993).
41. Metaphysical Realism and Psychologistic Semantics, *Erkenntnis* 34 (1991), 297-322.
42. New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth (with M. Timmons), *Journal of Philosophical Research* 16 (1991), 447-65; and in J. Heil (ed.), *Rationality, Morality, and Self-Interest: Essays Honoring Mark C. Overvold* (Rowman and Littlefield, 1993). Reprinted in R. Shafer-Landau and T. Cuneo, eds., *Foundations of Ethics* (Blackwell, 2007), 495-504.
43. Cognitive Systems as Dynamical Systems (with J. Tienson), *Topoi* 11 (1992), 27-43.
44. From Cognitive Science to Folk Psychology: Computation, Mental Representation, and Belief, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 55 (1992), 449-84. Review essay on books by J. Fodor, L. R. Baker, J. Garfield, and R. Cummins.
45. Structured Representations in Connectionist Systems? (with J. Tienson), in S. Davis, ed., *Connectionism: Theory and Practice* (Oxford, 1992), 195-228.
46. Troubles on Moral Twin Earth: Moral Queerness Revived (with M. Timmons), *Synthese* 92 (1992), 221-60.
47. Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantics: The 'Open Question Argument' Revived (with M. Timmons), *Philosophical Papers* 21 (1992), 153-75. Reprinted in A. Fisher and S. Kirchin, *Arguing About Metaethics* (Routledge, 2006), 179-199.
48. Analytic Functionalism Without Representational Functionalism, *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 16 (1993), 51. Peer commentary on "The Psychology of Folk Psychology," by Alvin Goldman.
49. The Austere Ideology of Folk Psychology. *Mind and Language* 8 (1993), 282-97. Forum on eliminativism in philosophy of mind.
50. From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World, *Mind* 102 (1993), 555-86. Invited "State of the Art" essay.
51. Levels of Description in Nonclassical Cognitive Science (with J. Tienson), *Philosophy* 34 (1993), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 159-88. Reprinted in J. L. Bermudez, ed., *Philosophy of Psychology: Contemporary Readings*. Routledge, 2006.
52. Metaphysical Naturalism, Semantic Normativity, and Meta-Semantic Irrealism (with M. Timmons), *Philosophical Issues* 4 (1993), 180-203.
53. Nonreductive Materialism and the Explanatory Autonomy of Psychology, in Wagner & Warner, eds., *Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal* (Notre Dame, 1993), 295-320.
54. On What There Isn't, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 50 (1993), 693-700. Symposium essay on P. van Inwagen's *Material Beings*.
55. Computation and Cognition. In S. Stich and F. Warfield, eds., *Mental Representation: A Reader* (Blackwell, 1994), 302-311. Excerpted from item 44 above.
56. Naturalism and Intentionality, *Philosophical Studies* 76 (1994), 301-26.
57. Reply to Egan, *Philosophical Studies* 76 (1994), 339-47. Reply to F. Egan's commentary on 'Naturalism and Intentionality'.
58. Nonreductive Materialism. In R. Warner and T. Szubka, eds., *The Mind-Body Problem* (Blackwell, 1994), 236-41. In Polish translation in *Znack*.
59. Representations Don't Need Rules: Reply to James Garson (with J. Tienson). *Mind and Language* 9 (1994), 38-55. Invited reply to Garson's critique of item 35.

60. Robust Vagueness and the Forced-March Sorites Paradox, *Philosophical Perspectives* 8, *Logic and Language* (1994), 159-88.
61. Southern Fundamentalism and the End of Philosophy (with G. Graham), *Philosophical Issues* 5 (1994), 219-47. Reprinted in M. DePaul and W. Ramsey (eds.), *Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophy*, Rowman and Littlefield, 1998.
62. A Nonclassical Framework for Cognitive Science (with J. Tienson), *Synthese* 101 (1994), 305-345. Issue on philosophy and connectionism.
63. Connectionism and the Commitments of Folk Psychology (with J. Tienson), *Philosophical Perspectives* 9 (1995), 127-52.
64. Let's Make a Deal, *Philosophical Papers* 24 (1995), 209-22.
65. Transvaluationism: A Dionysian Approach to Vagueness, *Southern Journal Philosophy* 33 (1995), Spindel Conference Supplement, 97-125.
66. Kim on the Mind-Body Problem, *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 47 (1996), 579-607.
67. The Perils of Epistemic Reductionism, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 66 (1996), 891-97. Symposium essay on C. Wright's *Truth & Objectivity*.
68. Troubles for Michael Smith's Metaethical Rationalism (with M. Timmons), *Philosophical Papers* 25 (1996), 203-231.
69. From Moral Realism to Moral Relativism in One Easy Step (with M. Timmons), *Critica* 28 (1996), 3-39.
70. Brute Supervenience, Deep Ignorance, and the Problem of the Many, *Philosophical Issues* 8 (1997), 229-36.
71. Connectionism and the Philosophical Foundations of Cognitive Science. *Metaphilosophy* 28 (1997), 1-30. Based on an invited overview talk, 1994 Eastern Division APA meeting. Reprinted in Chinese translation in L. Magnani and Li Ping, eds. *Philosophical Investigations from a Perspective of Cognition*. Guangdong People's Publishing House, 2006.
72. Precis of *Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology* (with J. Tienson), *Philosophical Psychology* 10 (1997), 337-56. Symposium on T. Horgan and J. Tienson, *Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology* (MIT Press).
73. Modelling the Noncomputational Mind: Reply to Litch, *Philosophical Psychology* 10 (1997), 365-71. Symposium on T. Horgan and J. Tienson, *Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology* (MIT Press).
74. Kim on Mental Causation and Causal Exclusion, *Philosophical Perspectives* 11 (1998), 165-84.
75. The Transvaluationist Conception of Vagueness, *The Monist* 81 (1998), 316-33.
76. Recognitional Concepts and the Compositionality of Concept Possession, *Philosophical Issues* 9 (1998), 27-33. Symposium paper on J. Fodor's "There are No Recognitional Concepts; Not Even RED," *Sociedad Filosofica Ibero Americana*, 1997.
77. Actualism, Quantification, and Contextual Semantics. *Philosophical Perspectives* 12 (1998), 503-09. Invited reply to J. Tomberlin, "Actualism, Naturalism, and Ontology."
78. Resisting the Tyranny of Terminology: The General Dynamical Hypothesis in Cognitive Science (with J. Tienson). *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 21 (1998), 643. Invited commentary on T. van Gelder, "The Dynamical Hypothesis in Cognitive Science."
79. Authors' Replies (with J. Tienson). *Acta Analytica* 22 (1999), 275-87. Issue containing proceedings from the 1997 conference on Horgan and Tienson's *Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology*.
80. Short Precis of *Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology* (with J. Tienson). *Acta Analytica* 22 (1999): 9-21.
81. Blobjectivism and Indirect Correspondence (with M. Potrc), *Facta Philosophica*, 2 (2000): 249-70.
82. Copping Out on Moral Twin Earth (with M. Timmons). *Synthese* 124 (2000), 139-52. Appears

- with D. Copp, "Milk, Honey, and the Good Life on Moral Twin Earth."
83. Facing Up to the Sorites Paradox. In A. Anamori (ed.), *Proceedings of the 20th World Congress of Philosophy. Volume 6: Analytic Philosophy and Logic*. Philosophy Documentation Center (2000), 99-111. Invited symposium paper for a session on Logic and Metaphysics.
 84. Iceberg Epistemology (with D. Henderson). *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 61 (2000), 497-535.
 85. Mary Mary, Quite Contrary (with G. Graham). *Philosophical Studies* 99 (2000), 59-87.
 86. Nondescriptivist Cognitivism: Framework for a New Metaethic (with M. Timmons). *Philosophical Papers* 29 (2000), 121-53. Reprinted in R. Shafer-Landau and T. Cuneo, eds., *Foundations of Ethics* (Blackwell, 2007), 58-70.
 87. Simulation and Epistemic Competence (with David Henderson). In H. Kobler and K. Steuber, (eds), *Empathy and Agency: The Problem of Understanding in the Social Sciences*. Westview, 2000, 119-43.
 88. The Two-Envelope Paradox, Nonstandard Expected Utility, and the Intensionality of Probability, *Nous* 34 (2000), 578-602.
 89. What Is A Priori and What Is It Good For? (with D. Henderson), *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 38, Spindel Conference Supplement on the Role of the Empirical and the A Priori in Philosophy (2000), 51-86.
 90. Causal Compatibilism and the Exclusion Problem. *Theoria* 16 (2001), 95-116. Issue on mental causation, edited by J. Corbi.
 91. Contextual Semantics and Metaphysical Realism: Truth as Indirect Correspondence. Invited for M. Lynch (ed.), *The Nature of Truth: Classic and Contemporary Perspectives*. MIT Press (2001), 67-95.
 92. Deconstructing New Wave Materialism (with J. Tienson). In B. Loewer, ed., *Physicalism and Its Discontents*. Cambridge University Press (2001), 307-18.
 93. Multiple Reference, Multiple Realization, and the Reduction of Mind. Invited for F. Siebelt and B. Preyer, eds., *Reality and Humean Supervenience: Essays on the Philosophy of David Lewis*. Rowman & Littlefield (2001), 205-21.
 94. Practicing Safe Epistemology (with D. Henderson). *Philosophical Studies* 102 (2001), 227-58.
 95. The Two-Envelope Paradox and the Foundations of Rational Decision Theory, in B. Brogaard and B. Smith, eds., *Rationality and Irrationality: Proceedings of the 23rd International Wittgenstein Symposium*. öbv & hpt (2001), 172-91.
 96. The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality (with J. Tienson). In D. Chalmers (ed.), *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings*. Oxford (2002), 520-33.
 97. The Salem Witch Project (with S. Tammelleo), *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 65 (2002), 193-200. For a symposium on M. Lance and J. O'Leary-Hawthorne, *The Grammar of Meaning*.
 98. Sensations and Grain Processes (with G. Graham). In J. Fetzer and G. Mulhauser (ed.), *Consciousness and the Algorithms of Evolution*. J. Benjamin (2002), 63-86.
 99. Addressing Questions for Bobjectivism (with M. Potrc), *Facta Philosophica* 4 (2002), 311-21.
 100. The A Priori Isn't All That It's Cracked Up to Be, But It Is Something (with D. Henderson). *Philosophical Topics* 29 (2002), 219-50. Issue honoring Alvin Goldman.
 101. Conceptual Relativity and Metaphysical Realism (with M. Timmons), *Philosophical Issues* 12 (2002), 74-96. Issue on realism and relativism.
 102. Themes in My Philosophical Work, *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 63 (2002), 1-26. Issue on the philosophy of Terence Horgan.
 103. Replies to Papers, *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 63 (2002), 303-41. Issue on the philosophy of Terence Horgan
 104. The Phenomenology of First-Person Agency (with J. Tienson and G. Graham). In S. Walter and H. D. Heckmann (eds.), *Physicalism and Mental Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind and*

- Action*. Imprint Academic (2003), 323-40.
105. Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat (with J. Tienson and G. Graham). In R. Schantz (ed.), *The Externalist Challenge*. Walter de Gruyter (2004), 297-317.
 106. Sleeping Beauty Awakened: New Odds at the Dawn of the New Day. *Analysis* 64 (2004), 10-20.
 107. Internal-World Skepticism and the Self-Presentational Nature of Phenomenal Consciousness (with J. Tienson and G. Graham). In M. Reicher and J. Marek (eds.), *Experience and Analysis: Proceedings of the 27th International Wittgenstein Symposium*. Obv & hpt, (2005), 191-207. Also in U. Kriegel and K. Williford (eds.), *Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness* (MIT, 2006), 41-61.
 108. Mary Mary, Au Contraire (with G. Graham), *Philosophical Studies* 122 (2005), 203-212. Invited response to D. Raffman, "Even Zombies Can Be Surprised: A Reply to Graham and Horgan," *Philosophical Studies* 122 (2005), 189-202.
 109. Moral Phenomenology and Moral Theory (with M. Timmons), *Philosophical Issues* 15 (2005), 56-77.
 110. The Phenomenology of Embodied Agency (with J. Tienson). In M. Saagua and F. de Ferro (eds.), *A Explicacao da Interpretacao Humana: The Explanation of Human Interpretation. Proceedings of the Conference Mind and Action III—May 2001*. Lisbon: Edicoes Colibri (2005), 415-23.
 111. What Does It Take to Be a True Believer? Against the Opulent Ideology of Eliminative Materialism (with D. Henderson), invited for C. Erneling and D. Johnson (eds.), *Mind as a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture*. Oxford University Press (2005), 211-24.
 112. Abundant Truth in an Austere World (with M. Potrc). In M. Lynch and P. Greenough (eds.), *Truth and Realism: New Essays*. Oxford (2006), 137-167.
 113. Introduction (with M. Timmons), T. Horgan and M. Timmons (eds.), *Metatethics After Moore*. Oxford University Press (2006), 1-15.
 114. Cognition Needs Syntax But Not Rules (with J. Tienson). In R. Stainton (ed.), *Contemporary Debates in Cognitive Science*. Blackwell, 2006.
 115. Cognitivist Expressivism (with M. Timmons). In T. Horgan and M. Timmons (eds.), *Metaethics After Moore*. Oxford University Press (2006), 255-98.
 116. Expressivism, Yes! Relativism, No! (with M. Timmons). In R. Shafer-Landau (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, Volume 1. Oxford (2006), 73-98.
 117. Materialism: Matters of Definition, Defense, and Deconstruction, *Philosophical Studies* 131 (2006), 157-183.
 118. Morality without Moral Facts (with M. Timmons). In J. Dreier (ed.), *Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory*. Blackwell (2006), 220-38.
 119. Particularist Semantic Normativity (with M. Potrc). *Acta Analytica* 21 (2006), 45-61.
 120. Transglobal Reliabilism (with D. Henderson). *Croatian Journal of Philosophy* 6 (2006), 171-195.
 121. Transvaluationism: The Benign Logical Incoherence of Vagueness. *Harvard Review of Philosophy* 14, (2006), 20-35.
 122. Truth as Mediated Correspondence (with B. Barnard). *The Monist* 89 (2006), 28-49.
 123. Agentive Phenomenal Intentionality and the Limits of Introspection. *Psyche* 13/2 (April 2007), 1-29.
 124. Consciousness and Intentionality (with G. Graham and J. Tienson). In M. Velmans and S. Schneider (eds.), *The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness*. Blackwell, 2007, 468-84.
 125. Mental Causation and the Agent-Exclusion Problem. *Erkenntnis* 67 (2007), 183-200. Papers from the 2005 Tuebingen Conference on Mental Causation, Externalism, and Self-Knowledge
 126. Moorean Moral Phenomenology (with M. Timmons). In S. Nuccetelli and G. Seay (eds.), *Themes from G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics*. Oxford (2007), 203-226.
 127. Morphological Rationalism and the Psychology of Moral Judgment (with M. Timmons), *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 10 (2007), 279-295.
 128. Phenomenal Epistemology: What is Phenomenal Consciousness that We May Know it So Well?

- (with U. Kriegel). *Philosophical Issues* 17 (2007), 123-144.
129. Synchronic Bayesian Updating and the Generalized Sleeping Beauty Problem. *Analysis* 67 (2007), 50-59.
 130. Transglobal Evidentialism-Reliabilism (with D. Henderson and M. Potrc). *Acta Analytica* 22 (2007), 281-300.
 131. Some Ins and Outs of Transglobal Reliabilism (with D. Henderson). In S. Goldberg, *Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology*, Oxford (2007), 100-130.
 132. Contextual Semantics and Particularist Semantic Normativity (with M. Potrc). In M. Lance, M. Potrc, and V. Strahovnik (eds.), *Challenging Moral Particularism*. Routledge (2008), 123-139.
 133. An Objectivist Argument for Thirdism (with J. Pollock and 15 other participants in his OSCAR seminar), *Analysis* 68 (2008), 149-155.
 134. Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind (with U. Kriegel). *The Monist* 91 (2008), 353-380.
 135. Prolegomena to a Future Phenomenology of Morals (with M. Timmons), *Psyche* 8 (2008): 115-131. Issue on moral phenomenology.
 136. Synchronic Bayesian Updating and the Sleeping Beauty Problem: Reply to Pust. *Synthese* 160 (2008), 155-159.
 137. Qualia Realism, Its Phenomenal Contents and Discontents (with G. Graham). In E. Wright (ed.), *The Case for Qualia*. MIT Press (2008), 89-107.
 138. What Does Moral Phenomenology Tell Us about Moral Objectivity? (with M. Timmons), *Social Philosophy & Policy* 25, 1 (2008): 267-300. Issue also published as E. F. Paul, F. Miller, and J. Paul (eds.), *Objectivism, Subjectivism, and Relativism in Ethics* (Cambridge, 2008).
 139. Analytical Moral Functionalism Meets Moral Twin Earth (with M. Timmons). In I. Ravenscroft (ed.), *Minds, Ethics and Conditionals: Themes from the Philosophy of Frank Jackson*. Oxford University Press (2009), 221-236.
 140. Epistemic Virtues and Cognitive Dispositions (with D. Henderson), in K. Steuber, G. Damschen, and R. Schnepf eds.), *Debating Dispositions: Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind*. DeGruyter (2009), 296-319
 141. Expressivism and Contrary-Forming Negation (with M. Timmons). *Philosophical Issues* 19 (2009), 92-112. Issue on metaethics.
 142. Mental Causation (with C. Maslen and H. Daly). In H. Beebe, C. Hitchcock, and P. Menzies (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Causation*. Oxford University Press (2009), 523-553.
 143. Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of Mind (with G. Graham and J. Tienson). In B. McLaughlin, A. Beckermann and S. Walter (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind*. Oxford University Press (2009), 512-537.
 144. Terence Horgan. In P.Grim (ed.), *Mind and Consciousness: 5 Questions* (Automatic Press, 2009), 105-106. Invited contribution, together with those of 19 other philosophers.
 145. What Does the Frame Problem Tell Us about Moral Normativity? (with M. Timmons), *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 12 (2009), 25-51. Invited for an issue on ethics and psychology.
 146. The Epistemic Relevance of Morphological Content (with M. Potrc). *Acta Analytica* 25 (2010), 155-173.
 147. Mandelbaum on Moral Phenomenology and Moral Realism (with M. Timmons). In I. Versteegen (ed.), *Maurice Mandelbaum and American Critical Realism*. Routledge (2010), 105-126.
 148. Materialism, Minimal Emergentism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness. In G. Bealer and R. Koons (eds), *The Waning of Materialism*. Oxford (2010), 309-329.
 149. Transvaluationism about Vagueness: A Progress Report. Invited for *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 48 (2010), 67-94. Re-inaugural issue.
 150. Untying a Knot from the Inside Out: Reflections on the ‘Paradox’ of Supererogation (with M. Timmons). *Social Philosophy and Policy* 27, 2 (2010), 29-63. This volume also published as E. Paul, F. Miller, and J. Paul (eds.), *Moral Obligation*. Cambridge University Press, 2010.

151. The Phenomenology of Agency and the Libet Results. In L. Nadel and W. Sinnott-Armstrong (eds.), *Conscious Will and Responsibility: A Tribute to Benjamin Libet*. Oxford (2010), 159-172.
152. Attention, Morphological Content and Epistemic Justification (with M. Potrc). *Croatian Journal of Philosophy* 11 (2011), 75-88.
153. Introspection and the Phenomenology of Free Will: Problems and Prospects (with M. Timmons). *Journal of Consciousness Studies* 18, 1 (2011), 180-205. Issue topic: *Describing Inner Experience: A Symposium Debating Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES)*.
154. From Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed. Invited for T. Bayne and M. Montague (eds.), *Cognitive Phenomenology*. Oxford (2011), 57-78.
155. The Phenomenology of Agency and Freedom: Lessons from Introspection and Lessons from Its Limits. *Humana Mente* 15 (Jan. 27, 2011), 77-97. Issue: *Agency: From Embodied Cognition to Free Will*. <http://www.humanamente.eu/Issues/Issue15.html>
156. Existence Monism Trumps Priority Monism (with M. Potrc). In P. Goff (ed.), *Spinoza on Monism*. Palgrave Macmillan (2012), 51-76.
157. Connectionism, Dynamical Cognition, and Non-Classical Compositional Representation. In E. Machery, W. Hinzen, and M. Werning (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Compositionality*. Oxford (2012), 557-573.
158. Introspection about Phenomenal Consciousness: Running the Gamut from Infallibility to Impotence. In D. Smythies and D. Stoljar (eds.), *Introspection and Consciousness*. Oxford (2012), 405-422.
159. Phenomenal Intentionality and Content Determinacy (with G. Graham). In R. Schantz (ed.), *Prospects for Meaning*. de Gruyter (2012), 321-344. In Spanish translation as "Intencionalidad fenoménica y determinación del contenido," in D. Pérez y L. Fernández Moreno (comps.) *Cuestiones filosóficas. Ensayos en honor de Eduardo Rabossi*, Editorial Catálogos, Buenos Aires (2008).
160. A Dialogue on Free Will. *Method* 2, 3 (2013), 66-80
161. Epistemological Skepticism, Semantic Blindness, and Competence-Based Performance Errors (with M. Potrc). *Acta Analytica* 28 (2013), 161-177.
162. Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem (with A. Mahtani). *Erkenntnis* 78 (2013), 333-351.
163. On the Armchair Justification of Conceptually Grounded Necessary Truths (with D. Henderson), in A. Casullo and J. Thurow (eds.), *The A Priori in Philosophy*. Oxford (2013), 111-133.
164. Original Intentionality is Phenomenal Intentionality. *The Monist* 96 (2013), 232-251.
165. The Real Moral of the Chinese Room: Understanding Requires Understanding Phenomenology. *American Philosophical Association Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers* 12: 2 (2013), 1-6.
166. The Synthetic Unity of Truth (with B. Barnard), in C. Wright and N. Pederson (eds.), *Truth and Pluralism*, Oxford (2013), 157-179.
167. Risk Sensitive Animal Knowledge (with D. Henderson), *Philosophical Studies* 166 (2013), 599-608. Book symposium on Ernest Sosa's *Knowing Full Well*.
168. Twin Earth, Moral (with M. Timmons). *International Encyclopedia of Ethics* (2013), 5242-5249.
169. Phenomenal Intentionality and Secondary Qualities: The Quixotic Case of Color. In B. Brogaard (ed.), *Does Perception Have Content?* Oxford (2014), 329-350.
170. Virtue and the Fitting Culturing of the Human Critter (with D. Henderson). In A. Fairweather and O. Flanagan (eds.), *Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue*. Cambridge (2014), 197-222.
171. Blobjectivism and Art (with M. Potrc). In J. Jaskey, S. Malik, and C. Cox (eds.), *Realism Materialism Art*. Sternberg Press (2015), 145-149.
172. Exploring Intuitions on Moral Twin Earth: Reply to Sonderholm (with M. Timmons). *Theoria* 81 (2015): 355-375.
173. Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem, II. *Erkenntnis* 80 (2015): 811-

- 839.
174. Injecting the Phenomenology of Agency into the Free Will Debate. In D. Shoemaker (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility*, 3. Oxford (2015), 34-61.
 175. Modest Quasi-Realism and the Problem of Deep Moral Error (with M. Timmons). In R. Johnson and M. Smith (eds.), *Passions and Projections: Themes from the Philosophy of Simon Blackburn*. Oxford (2015), 190-209.
 176. Newcomb's Problem Revisited. *The Harvard Review of Philosophy* 22, (Fall 2015): 4-15.
Reprinted with additions in my *Essays on Paradoxes*, Oxford (2016), 46-59.
 177. The Zero Point and I (with S. Nichols). In S. Miguens, G. Preyer, and C. B. Morando (eds.), *Pre-Reflective Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind*. Routledge (2015), 143-175.
 178. What's the Point? (with D. Henderson). In J. Greco and D. Henderson (eds.), *Epistemic Evaluation: Point and Purpose in Epistemology*. Oxford (2015), 87-114.
 179. Abductive Inference, Explicable and Anomalous Disagreement, and Epistemic Resources (with D. Henderson). *Res Philosophica* 93 (2016): 567-584.
 180. A Solution to the Paradox of Analysis (with M. Balaguer). *Analysis* 76 (2016): 3-7.
 181. Epistemic Probability. In my *Essays on Paradoxes* (Oxford, 2017), 281-318.
 182. The Exchange Continued: Response to Pust's Response to My Reply. Epistemic Probability. In my *Essays on Paradoxes* (Oxford, 2017), 226-246.
 183. Sentimentalist Moral-Perceptual Experience and Realist Pretensions: A Phenomenological Inquiry (with M. Timmons). In R. Debes and K. Steuber (eds.), *Ethical Sentimentalism* (Cambridge, 2017), 86-106.
 184. Nonconciliation in Peer Disagreement: Its Phenomenology and Its Rationality (with D. Henderson, M. Potrč, and H. Tierney). *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, 94 (2017): 194-225.
 185. Troubles for Bayesian Formal Epistemology. *Res Philosophica* 94 (2017): 233-255.
 186. Core and Ancillary Epistemic Virtues (with M. Potrč and V. Strahovnik). *Acta Analytica* 33, 3 2018: 295-309.
 187. Gripped by Authority (with M. Timmons). *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 48, 3-4 (2018): 313-336.
 188. The Phenomenology of Moral Authority (with M. Timmons). In D. Machuca (ed.), *Moral Skepticism: New Essays* (Routledge, 2018), 115-140.
 189. Philosophy and Science Dialogue: Mental Causation (with T. Wheatley). *Frontiers of Philosophy in China* 13, 3 (2018): 349-60.
 190. Seventy Years in Philosophy of Mind: An Overview, with Emphasis on the Issue of Mental Causation. *Frontiers of Philosophy in China* 13, 3 (2018): 300-331.
 191. The Soritical Centipede (with N. Ballantyne and B. Fiala). *Nous* 53, 2 (2019): 491-510.
 192. Evidentially Embedded Epistemic Entitlement (with D. Henderson). *Synthese*, in press.
 193. Morphological Content and Chromatic Illumination in Belief Fixation (with D. Henderson and M. Potrč). In T. Chan and A. Nes (eds.) *Inference and Consciousness* (Routledge, in press).
 194. Ontological Vagueness: Why It's Impossible, and Why the Metaphysical and Semantic Consequences are Severe (with M. Potrč). In A. Abasnezhad and O. Bueno (eds.) *The Sorites (Synthese Studies in Philosophy)*, in press).

BOOKS:

- Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology* (with J. Tienson), Bradford/M.I.T., 1996.
Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology (with M. Potrč), MIT, 2008.
The Epistemological Spectrum: At the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis (with D. Henderson), Oxford, 2011.
Essays on Paradoxes. Oxford, 2017.

REVIEWS AND CRITICAL STUDIES:

1. Review of I. Porn, *Action Theory and Social Science*, in *Philosophical Review*, 1979.
2. Review of J. Thompson, *Acts and Other Events*, in *Philosophy of Science*, 1979.
3. Review of A. O'Hear, *Karl Popper*, in *Philosophical Review*, 1983.
4. Review of T. Beauchamp and A. Rosenberg, *Hume and the Problem of Causation*, in *Philosophical Review*, 1985.
5. Review of J. Trusted, *Free Will and Responsibility*, in *Nous*, 1987.
6. Review of M. Brand, *Intending and Acting*, in *Grazer Philosophische Studien*, 1987.
7. Review of *Philosophical Perspectives I: Metaphysics*, for *Nous*, 1990.
8. Review of F. Dretske, *Explaining Behavior*, for *Mind and Language*, 1990.
9. Review of A. Clark, *Microcognition: Philosophy, Cognitive Science, and Parallel Distributed Processing*, for *Mind*, 1991.
10. Critical study of Crispin Wright, *Truth and Objectivity*, *Nous* 29 (1995), 127-38.
11. Review of Paul Churchland, *The Engine of Reason and the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain*, for *Acta Analytica* 16 (2001), 157-60.
12. Critical Study of Joseph Levine, *Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness*, *Nous*, 2006.
13. Retreat from Non-Being: Critical Study of Graham Priest, *Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality*, for *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 84 (2006), 615-27.
14. What Broke the Window? Review of Amie Thomasson, *Ordinary Objects*, in *Times Literary Supplement*, June 6, 2008.
15. Review of Amie Thomasson, *Ordinary Objects*, in *Notre Dame Philosophy Reviews*, May 22, 2008.
16. Phenomenal Intentionality and the Evidential Role of Perceptual Experience: Comments on Jack Lyons, *Perception and Basic Beliefs*, *Philosophical Studies*, in *Philosophical Studies* 153 (2011): 447-455.
17. Review of Robert Stalnaker, *Our Knowledge of the External World*, in *Mind* 120 (2011): 561-65.
18. Critical Study of Gila Sher, *Epistemic Friction*, for *Mind* 127 (2017): 881-890.

DICTIONARY/ENCYCLOPEDIA ENTRIES:

1. Physicalism, in S. Gluttenplan, *A Companion to Philosophy of Mind* (Blackwell, 1994), 471-79.
2. Folk Psychology, in R. Audi, ed., *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1995), 268-70.
3. Reduction/Reductionism, in J. Kim and E. Sosa, eds., *A Companion to Metaphysics* (Blackwell, 1995), 438-40.
4. Supervenience, in R. Audi, ed., *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1995), 778-79.
5. Connectionism. *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Supplement (Macmillan, 1996), 95-96.
6. Reduction, Reductionism. *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Supplement (Macmillan, 1996), 438-40.
7. Rules (with J. Tienson). *A Companion to Cognitive Science* (Blackwell, 1998), 660-70.
8. Rules and Representations (with J. Tienson). *The MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science* (MIT, 1999), 724-26.
9. Supervenience. *The MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science*, (MIT, 1999), 812-14.
10. Jaegwon Kim (with Helen Daly), in J. Kim, E. Sosa and G. Rosencrantz, eds., *A Companion to Metaphysics, Second Edition* (Blackwell, 2009), 358-360.

EDITED COLLECTIONS:

- Spindel Conference 1983: Supervenience*, *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, Supplement, 1984.
Spindel Conference 1987: Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind, *Southern Journal of Philosophy*,

Supplement (with John Tienson), 1988.
Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind (with J. Tienson). Kluwer, 1991.
Erkenntnis 34, 3 (May 1991): Special Issue on Putnam's Philosophy. Guest Editors: H. Putnam and T. Horgan.
Spindel Conference 1994: Vagueness, Southern Journal of Philosophy, Supplement, 1995.
 Issue of *Acta Analytica* (with M. Potrc) with selected papers from the 1998 Bled vagueness conference, 2000.
Spindel Conference 1999: The Role of the Empirical and the A Priori in Epistemology (with D. Henderson), 2000.
Spindel Conference 2002: 100 Years of Metaethics: The Legacy of G.E. Moore (with M. Timmons), 2003.
Metaethics after Moore (with M. Timmons). Oxford, 2006.
Qualia and Mental Causation in a Physical World: Themes from the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim (with M. Sabates and D. Sosa). Cambridge, 2015.

BOOKS IN PREPARATION:

Illuminating Reasons: An Essay in Moral Phenomenology (with M. Timmons), under contract with Oxford University Press.
Papers on Materialism and Mind (working title), under contract with Oxford University Press. A collection of my papers in metaphysics and philosophy of
Phenomenal Intentionality (with G. Graham and J. Tienson, working title), under contract with Oxford University Press.
Moral Twin Earth and Beyond: Metaethical Meditations, a collection of co-authored metaethics papers by Mark Timmons and me, under contract with Oxford University Press.

RECENT PRESENTATIONS:

Narrow Content and the Phenomenology of Intentionality (with J. Tienson), Presidential Address, Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Columbia University, June 2000.
 The Two-Envelope Paradox and the Foundations of Rational Decision Theory, invited for the 23rd International Wittgenstein Symposium: Rationality and Irrationality, Kirchberg, Austria, August 2000.
 Themes in my Philosophical Work, invited for the Austro-Slovene Philosophical Association, Celje, Slovenia, August 2000.
 Brief commentaries on some 25-30 papers on my philosophical work, Section on the Philosophy of Terence Horgan, Austro-Slovene Philosophical Association, Celje, Slovenia, August 2000.
 Deconstructing New Wave Materialism (with J. Tienson), European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Salzburg, Austria, September 2000.
 Transvaluationism and the Benign Logical Incoherence of Vagueness. Notre Dame University, November 2000; Ohio State University, January 2001.
 The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality, University of Arizona, April 2001; Indiana University, April 2002; NEH Institute on Phenomenology and Intentionality, UC Santa Cruz, June 2002.
 Response to Michael Lynch's "Contextual Semantics and the Nature of Metaphysics," Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, April 2001.
 Human Interpretation and the Phenomenology of Agency (with J. Tienson), Mind and Action III Conference, Lisbon, May 2001
 Addressing Questions for Blobjectivism (with M. Potrc), Conference on Metaphysics, Bled (Slovenia),

- June 2001.
- Morphological Content and Justified Belief (with D. Henderson), invited symposium paper for APA Eastern Division, Atlanta, December 2001. (Presented by Henderson)
- Conceptual Relativity and Metaphysical Realism (with M. Timmons), keynote address, Midsouth Philosophy Conference, Memphis, February 2002.
- Causal Compatibilism and the Exclusion Problem, symposium on mental causation, Midsouth Philosophy Conference, Memphis, February 2002.
- Response to Michael Lynch and Joshua Glasgow, "The Impossibility of Superdupervenience," Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Nashville, March 2002.
- The Phenomenology of Intentionality and the Intentionality of Phenomenology, Indiana University, April 2002; NEH Institute on Phenomenology and Intentionality, UC Santa Cruz, June 2002.
- Response to Heimir Geirsson, "Trouble for Moral Twin Earth," APA Central Division, Chicago, April 2002.
- Response to Charles Siewert, "Attending to Experience," APA Pacific Division, San Francisco, March 2003.
- Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat. University of Montana, September 2003
- Cognitivist Expressivism. Harvard U., March 2004. U. of Cincinnati conference on "Nature, Normativity, and the Autonomy of the Mind" (invited keynoter), May 2004.
- Connectionism, Dynamical Cognition, and Non-Classical Compositional Representation. U. of Dusseldorf, conference on compositional representation (invited), February 2004.
- Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat. Keynote talk at U. of Utah Graduate Student Philosophy Conference, February 2004; U. of Cincinnati conference on mind and normativity (invited keynoter), May; North Carolina State University, November 2004.
- Conscious Will Is No Illusion. Symposium on the experience of free will, Toward a Science of Consciousness conference (invited), Tucson, April 2004.
- Austere Metaphysics, Ontological Commitment, and Truth. Preconference for graduate students prior to St. Andrews conference on truth and normativity, June 2004.
- Austere Realism and Quasi-Particularist Semantic Normativity. U. of St. Andrews conference on truth and realism, June 2004.
- Internal-World Skepticism and the Self-Presentational Character of Phenomenal Consciousness. Kirchberg Wittgenstein Symposium, "Experience and Analysis," August 2004.
- Expressivism, Yes! Relativism, No! (Co-presented with M. Timmons). U. of Wisconsin metaethics workshop, October 2004.
- Commentary on J. Kim's paper on explanatory arguments for type-identity materialism. APA Pacific Division, March 2004.
- Commentary on papers by A. Goldman and J. Weinberg, symposium on the epistemic status of intuitions in epistemology. APA Central Division, April 2004.
- Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat. University of Cincinnati, May 2004; North Carolina State University, November 2004.
- Phenomenal Intentionality and the Brain in a Vat; Abundant Truth in an Austere World. Wake Forest University Philosophy Department, February 2005.
- Some Ins and Outs of Transglobal Reliabilism, presented by co-author Henderson at the University of Kentucky, conference on internalism and externalism in semantics and epistemology, April 2005.
- Transglobal Reliabilism, presented by co-author Henderson at conference on metaphysics and epistemology, Dubrovnik (Croatia), June 2005.
- Particularist Semantic Normativity (with M. Potrc), co-presented with Potrc at conference on particularism, Bled (Slovenia), June 2005.
- Epistemology at the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis. Cognitive Science Master Seminar, U. of Arizona. September 2005.

- Causal Compatibilism about Agentive Phenomenology. Consciousness Center, U. of Arizona, October. Conference on mental causation, U. of Tuebingen, October 2005.
- Transvaluationism: The Benign Logical Incoherence of Vagueness. U. of Pamplona (Spain), and Arche Vagueness Workshop at U. of St. Andrews (Scotland), November 2005.
- Cognitivist Expressivism. Institute of Philosophy, University of London. November 2005.
- Epistemology at the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis. Cognitive Science Program, U. of Minnesota, December 2005.
- Causal Compatibilism about Agentive Phenomenology. Philosophy Department, U. of Minnesota, December 2005.
- The Hidden in Phenomenal Consciousness. Symposium on Consciousness and Introspection, APA Pacific Division, March 2006.
- Causal Compatibilism about Agentive Phenomenology, plus group discussion of several Horgan/Timmons metaethics papers. Bowling Green State University, April 2006.
- Retreat from Non-Being. Author Meets Critic Session on G. Priest, Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality, APA Central Division, April 2006.
- Compatibilism about Agentive Phenomenology. Conference on Freedom and Determinism, Bled, Slovenia, June 2006.
- Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology. Keynote, Arizona Ontology Conference, U. of Arizona, January 2007.
- Commentary on Helen Beebe, "Truthmakers, Who Needs 'Em?'" Arizona Ontology Conference, U. of Arizona, January 2007.
- Mental Causation and the Agent-Exclusion Problem. Lewis and Clark College, February 2007, University of California at Santa Barbara, March 2007.
- Objective Epistemic Likelihood and Particularist Epistemic Normativity (with M. Potrc), Conference on Epistemology, Bled, Slovenia, May 2007.
- Participant in a 3-day workshop on my work in philosophy of mind and metaethics, University of Tuebingen, June 2007.
- Consciousness and Moral Principles (with M. Timmons), University of Arizona Consciousness Center Colloquium Series, September 2007.
- Transvaluationism about Vagueness: A Progress Report. University of Arizona metaphysics and epistemology discussion group, September 2007; University of Nebraska, February 2008.
- Materialist Naturalism and the Philosophy of Mind, conference on the future of naturalism, Center for Inquiry Transnational, University of Buffalo, September 2007; conference on philosophical naturalism, Kansas State University, April 2008; local chapter of Center for Inquiry Transnational, Tucson, September 2008.
- Intuitive Bayesian Updating in Probabilistic Reasoning, in Shaun Nichols' experimental philosophy research group, University of Arizona, October 2007.
- The Computational Theory of Mind vs. the Dynamical Cognition Framework. For a session (with John Pollock) on the computational theory of mind and the relevance problem, University of Arizona cognitive science master seminar, November 2007.
- Transglobal Evidentialism-Reliabilism, University of Oklahoma, March 2007.
- Commentator on Susanna Schellenberg, 'Perceptual Content, Representation, and Relations', APA Pacific Division, March 2008.
- Commentator on Don Fallis, 'Resolving Horgan's Strengthened Two-Envelope Paradox', APA Central Division, April 2008.
- Roads to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed, workshop on phenomenal consciousness and intentionality, University of Fribourg, July 2008.
- Lectures on compatibilism, in a team-taught 2-week summer school graduate course on freedom, determinism, and responsibility, Central European University, Budapest, July 2008.
- The Two-Envelope Paradox, the Intensionality of Probability, and the Foundations of Decision Theory, Central European University, Budapest, July 2008.

- Vague Content in a Non-Vague World (with M. Potrc), conference on consciousness and thought, Inter-University Center, Dubrovnik, Croatia, August 2008.
- The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Project (with U. Kriegel), retirement conference for Ruth Millikan, University of Connecticut, October 2008; workshop on the phenomenal intentionality research project, University of Arizona, October 2008; Australian National University, November 2008.
- The Sleeping Beauty Problem, invited session on my work on the Sleeping Beauty problem in Barry Loewer's probability seminar, Rutgers University, October 2008.
- Introspection about Phenomenal Consciousness: Running the Gamut from Infallibility to Impotence. Workshop on introspection, Australian National University, November 2008.
- Sleeping Sarah, Sleeping Hillary, and Sleeping Beauty. Workshop on the Sleeping Beauty Problem, Australian National University, November 2008.
- The Phenomenology of Agency and the Libet Results, University of Sydney, November 2008.
- What Does the Frame Problem Tell Us About Moral Normativity? Indiana University, December 2008.
- Materialist Naturalism and the Philosophy of Mind. The Phoenix Salon (a cultural organization), January 2009.
- Updating the Agenda for the Metaphysics of Mind. Keynote address, Graduate Student Conference on the Metaphysics of Mind. University of Missouri at St. Louis, March 2009.
- Updating the Agenda for the the Metaphysics of Mind. Fifth International Colloquium on Philosophy of Mind: Physicalism and Its Critics. Joa Passoa, Brazil. May, 2009.
- Tutorial on my work in philosophy of mind. Fifth International Colloquium on Philosophy of Mind: Physicalism and Its Critics. Joa Passoa, Brazil. May 2009.
- Attention, Morphological Content, and Epistemic Justification (with M. Potrc). Conference on attention, Dubrovnik, Croatia. May 2009.
- Epistemic Functional Superpositions (with D. Henderson). Conference on epistemology, Bled, Slovenia. June 2009
- The Epistemic Relevance of Morphological Content (with M. Potrc). Conference on epistemology, Bled, Slovenia. June 2009.
- Lectures on phenomenal intentionality, in a team-taught week-long graduate summer school on philosophy of mind. University of Riga, Latvia. July 2009.
- Guest attendance in George Graham's philosophy of mind class, to discuss my work on consciousness, intentionality, and phenomenal intentionality. Georgia State University, April 2009.
- The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program, Georgia State University, April 2009.
- Rationality and Backwards Induction in Centipede Games. University of Alabama, September 2009.
- Mind and Brain: Philosophy of Mind in the Twenty-First Century. University of Alabama, September 2009.
- Guest attendance in Chase Wren's seminar on truth, to discuss my work on truth. University of Alabama, September 2009.
- Presentation on my work with Mark Timmons in metaethics. Interdisciplinary workshop on moral psychology, University of Arizona, November 2009.
- Rationality and Backwards Induction in Centipede Games. University of Arizona Economic Science Lab, December 2009.
- Rationality and Backwards Induction in Centipede Games. University of Nebraska, February 2010.
- Transvaluationism about Vagueness: A Progress Report. University of Canterbury New Zealand, July 2010.
- Cognitivist Expressivism, the Frege-Geach Problem, and Negation. Philosophy workshop, Kaikoura, New Zealand, July 2010.
- From Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed. University of Canterbury and University of Otago, August 2010.
- The Soritical Centipede: Rationality and Backwards Induction in Centipede Games. University of Canterbury and University of Auckland, August 2010.

- Existence Monism vs. Priority Monism. Victoria University of Wellington, August 2010.
- From Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed. Workshop on agentive and cognitive phenomenology, University of Fribourg (Switzerland), September 2010.
- Phenomenal Intentionality and Content Determinacy. Chalmers/Sider Seminar on Mind and Language, September 2010.
- From Agentive Phenomenology to Cognitive Phenomenology: A Guide for the Perplexed. Invited talk, Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, New Orleans, March 2011.
- Existence Monism Trumps Priority Monism. Symposium on fundamentality, APA Pacific Division, San Diego, April 2011.
- Epistemological Skepticism, Semantic Blindness, and Competence-Based Performance Errors (with M. Potrc). Conference on epistemology, Bled, Slovenia, June 2011.
- Metaphysically Lightweight Posits (with M. Potrc). Conference on John Searle's *Making the Social World*, San Raffaele University, Milan (Italy), June 2011.
- Low-Grade A Priori Knowledge. Conference on the epistemology of philosophy. University of Cologne (Germany), June 2011.
- The Spectrum of Introspection: Why Introspection of Phenomenal Consciousness Runs the Gamut from Infallibility to Impotence. Workshop on consciousness, introspection, and cognitive science. University of Arizona, September 2011.
- Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem. University of Calgary, October 2011.
- Existence Monism Trumps Priority Monism. University of Nevada at Las Vegas, December 2011.
- The Real Moral of the Chinese Room: Understanding Requires Understanding Phenomenology. Symposium on Machine Consciousness, APA Central Division, February 2012.
- Commentary. Author Meets Critics Session on Derk Pereboom, *Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism*, APA Central Division, Chicago, February, 2012.
- Let's Make a Deal. John Pollock Conference, University of Arizona, March, 2012.
- Guest Visit, Bernard Kobes's seminar on emergentism, Arizona State University, March 2012. Discussion of my papers on supervenience and minimal emergentism.
- Commentary on Robert Howell, "Phenomenal Content and the New Evil Demon," APA Pacific Division, Seattle, April, 2012.
- The Epistemological Spectrum (with David Henderson). Reading group workshop on D. Henderson and T. Horgan, *The Epistemological Spectrum*. University of North Florida, March 2012.
- Implicit Reasons and Doxastic Justification in Iceberg Epistemology. Epistemology Workshop. College de France, Paris, April 2012.
- Reasons-Responsive Moral Judgment. Society for Philosophy and Psychology (invited lecture). Boulder, CO, June 2012.
- Newcomb's Problem and the Foundations of Decision Theory. Cognitive Science Master Seminar (invited presentation). University of Arizona, October 2012.
- Newcomb's Problem: An Antinomy of Practical Reason. Colorado College, January 2013.
- Nonconciliation in Peer Disagreement: Its Phenomenology and Its Rationality (with M. Potrc). Conference on Epistemology, Bled (Slovenia). June 2013.
- Author meets critics session on D. Henderson and T. Horgan, *The Epistemological Spectrum: At the Interface of Cognitive Science and Conceptual Analysis*. American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division. San Francisco, March 2013.
- On the Satisfaction Conditions of Free-Agency Phenomenology: The Self-Sourcehood Aspect, the Alternate-Possibilities Aspect, and the Limits of Introspection. Workshop on the Phenomenology of Free Agency. University of Fribourg (Switzerland), June 2013.
- Reasons-Responsive Moral Judgment and the Phenomenology of Moral Experience. Cognitive Science Colloquium. University of Arizona, September 2013.
- The Self as Zero Point vs. the Represented Self. Workshop on Self-Representationalism, Pre-Reflectivity, and Mental Impairment. University of Bielefeld (Germany), September 2013.
- Nonconciliation in Peer Disagreement: Its Phenomenology and its Rationality. University of Miami,

October 2013.

- Injecting the Phenomenology of Agency into the Free Will Debate. New Orleans Workshop on Agency and Responsibility, November 2013. California State University Los Angeles, February 2014.
- Ontological Vagueness: Why It's Impossible, and Why the Metaphysical and Semantic Consequences are Severe. Symposium on Meta-Ontology, American Philosophical Association Pacific Division, April 2014.
- Injecting the Phenomenology of Agency into the Free Will Debate. Marc Sanders Foundation Lecture, American Philosophical Association Pacific Division, April 2014.
- Phenomenal Intentionality and Holism (with D. Tienson). Conference: Thinking about Consciousness and Conscious Thinking. University of Mississippi, April 2014.
- Illuminating Reasons: An Inquiry into the Phenomenology of Moral Experience (with M. Timmons). Illuminating Reasons (Conference on Moral Phenomenology), University of Arizona, October 2014. Funded through my Templeton Foundation grant with Mark Timmons.
- Phenomenal Intentionality with Compromise. Workshop on Phenomenal Intentionality, Central European University (Budapest), November 2014.
- Epistemic Probability. Arizona State University, February 2015.
- Injecting the Phenomenology of Agency into the Free Will Debate. Keynote lecture, Southeastern Graduate Philosophy Conference, University of Florida, March, 2015.
- Commentary on Galen Strawson, The Primacy of Pan-Psychism. APA Pacific Division, Vancouver, April, 2015.

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS:

- Phi Beta Kappa, Stanford
- B.A. with Great Distinction, Honors in Philosophy, Honors in Humanities
- NSF Graduate Traineeship, 1970-71 and 1971-72
- Rackham Predoctoral Fellowship, 1972-73
- DePauw University Faculty Research Award, 1978
- NEH Summer Stipend, 1978
- Illinois State University Summer Research Grant, 1979 and 1980
- Memphis State University Summer Research Grant, 1982
- NEH Summer Stipend, 1983
- Memphis State University Noninstructional Assignment, spring 1985
- Memphis State University SPUR Award for Superior Research, 1986
- NEH Summer Seminar, "Philosophical Problems About Truth and Reality," directed by Hilary Putnam, 1986
- NEH Fellowship for College Teachers, 1988-89
- Memphis State University Noninstructional Assignment, 1988-89
- Memphis State University SPUR Award for Superior Research, 1992
- Memphis State University Distinguished Research Award, 1993
- College of Arts and Sciences Distinguished Research Award (with J. Tienson), U. of Memphis, 1997.
- College of Arts and Sciences Eminent Faculty Award, U. of Memphis, 1997.
- Robert Dunavant University Professorship, 1998-2001.
- University of Memphis Distinguished Research Award (with J. Tienson), spring 1999.
- Templeton Foundation Grant (with M. Timmons), 2012-2013. For writing a book during the period of August 2012 to August 2013 and convening a conference on themes from the book. Half salary for myself and Timmons, matched by half salary to us both from University of Arizona.
- Marc Sanders Lecturer, 2014. Awarded by American Philosophical Association.

NATIONAL AND REGIONAL PROFESSIONAL POSITIONS:

Nominating Committee, APA Central Division, 1986-87
President, Tennessee Philosophical Association, 1986-87
Editorial Board, *Behavior and Philosophy*, 1986-
Chairman, Program Committee for 1989 meeting, APA Central Division
Editorial Board, *Philosophical Papers*, 2001-
Editorial Board, *Philosophical Psychology*, 1987-
Editorial Board, *Sorites*, 1995- [Electronic philosophy journal]
Editorial Board, *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 2010-
Advisory Board, *Acta Analytica*, 1998-
Secretary/Treasurer, Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 1991-94
Advisory Committee to the Program Committee, APA Eastern Division, 1994-97
Executive Council, Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 1996-99
President, Society for Philosophy and Psychology, 1999-2000
Executive Committee, APA Central Division, 2000-2003
Editorial Board, Blackwell Philosophy *Compass* series, 2006-
Editorial Board, *Abstracta* (Brazilian analytic philosophy journal), 2009-